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Abstract 
Region 5 is one of the most impoverished and insecure regions of Ethiopia. For 
decades, the region has suffered from a multitude of armed conflicts involving state and 
non-state actors. Region 5 is also one of the most underserved states of Ethiopia with 
some of the lowest levels of human development indicators nationwide. Although the 
adversities of poverty and conflict are widely acknowledged in their own respect, there 
has been little or no inquest into why poverty and conflict have prevailed under the same 
space for decades. Poverty and conflict have often been seen as separate phenomena that 
are dealt with using different sets of theories and practices in the real world. Nonetheless, 
a closer look at poverty and conflict in Region 5 reveals that both are strongly connected 
to each other. The poverty-conflict trap has been an on-going cycle in the region for the 
last five decades. The main intent of this research paper is analyzing the two-way 
relationship between poverty and conflict in Region 5. By studying this relationship, this 
analysis seeks to contribute to a new framework that brings peacebuilding and 
development closer. 
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1. Poverty and Conflict: A Self-Perpetuating Cycle in the Somali Regional State 
(Region 5), Ethiopia: 1960-2010 
The Somali Regional State or Region 5 is one of the poorest and least developed 
regions with some of the lowest levels of human development indicators nationwide. 
The inhabitants of the region posses limited or no access to social, economic, and 
political resources needed for a decent standard of living. Region 5 is also one of the 
most conflict-prone and unstable regions of Ethiopia with a long history of violent 
conflicts. Various conflicts ranging from communal disputes to rebel insurgencies 
characterize the region, not to mention the regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa. 
Although the adversities of poverty and conflict are widely acknowledged in their own 
respects, there has been little or no inquest into why poverty and conflict have prevailed 
together for decades. This is because poverty and conflict have often been seen as 
separate phenomena that are dealt with using different sets of theories and practices in 
the real world. Nonetheless, a closer look at poverty and conflict in Region 5 reveals that 
both are strongly connected in a reciprocal relationship. The poverty-conflict trap has 
been an on-going cycle in the region for the last five decades. 
 Although scholars are far from a consensus on the primary causes of armed 
conflicts, several studies show the fact that civil wars erupt in countries suffering from 
poverty and economic decline. How poverty triggers conflict is, however, another line of 
contention between political economists and social psychologists. This divide is usually 
played out along the greed-grievance debate. The greed rebellion theory presents a 
simple rational choice model where the rebel’s aspiration for self-enrichment and 
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growth serves as the primary motive of civil wars in developing countries. On the other 
hand, the grievance model argues that the social discontent arising from the relative 
deprivation of social groups is a potent source of civil wars in the developing world. 
Poverty is one of the prime causes of armed conflicts in Region 5. The relative 
deprivation of the region’s inhabitants that results from their unequal share of social, 
economic, and political resources nationally is a strong source of social discontent. 
However, their perception of deprivation contextualizes not from an absolute standard, 
but through a comparison of their socio-economic position with the actual and perceived 
circumstances of other social groups in Ethiopia. This is especially important because 
they perceive their deprivation and unequal socio-economic status coinciding with their 
collective identity. The grievance resulting from such systematic inequalities has been 
used by political entrepreneurs and rebel movements to mobilize civilians for collective 
violence. 
On the other side of the conflict-poverty cycle, armed conflict has directly and 
indirectly contributed to the region’s poverty status. In the last five decades, conflict has 
destroyed and reduced the human, physical, economic, social, and natural capitals of the 
region. The inhabitants have suffered from death, physical and psychological injuries, 
forced migration, trade blockade, restriction on mobility, killing and confiscation of 
livestock, and famine as a result of armed conflict. These damages were not only the 
unintended outcome of warfare, but also part of the government’s deliberate 
counterinsurgency strategy that targeted civilians and their economic base. These factors 
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have greatly affected the welfare of the people and pushed the majority of Region 5 into 
poverty. 
 Poverty and conflict are often seen as independent phenomena with little or no 
impact on one another. On the contrary, this practice of isolating conflict and poverty 
has long ignored their double causation and cyclical relationship within the context of 
Region 5. The main goal of this research paper is analyzing this two-way relationship 
between poverty and conflict in Region 5. The study employs various theories in social 
psychology, conflict resolution, development studies, and economics in examining the 
causes and effects of poverty and conflict in Region 5 within the last five decades.  
The structure for the rest of the paper is as follows. The second chapter of this 
paper will cover the geographic and demographic background of Ethiopia and Region 5. 
It also includes information on the geography and modern history of the Horn of Africa. 
The third chapter focuses on the dynamics of armed conflicts in the region. One of the 
unique characteristics of armed conflicts in Region 5 is that they occur within complex 
regional dynamic connecting local, national, and international factors. The armed 
conflicts in the region are highly connected with each other and therefore require a wider 
and comprehensive approach in analyzing them. The fourth chapter is concerned with 
clarifying the two research variables, poverty and conflict. Both are multidimensional 
concepts that shift their meanings in time. It is therefore crucial to have a clear 
understanding of these two variables before analyzing their two-way connection.  
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The fifth chapter contains a review of literature on some of the critical areas of the study. 
The sixth chapter analyzes the different theories that have been used to establish a 
relationship from poverty to conflict. It highlights the greed versus grievance debate that 
has remained a major line of difference between political economists and social 
psychologists on linking poverty to conflict. The chapter deals on how these theories 
apply to the reality in Region 5. This section also lays out the conceptual framework that 
leads from conflict to poverty. It identifies the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) 
for assessing the socio-economic impact of armed conflicts and documents on how this 
concept practically applies to the situation in Region 5. Chapter seven wraps up this 
research paper. 
Research Purpose 
 Although there is a growing amount of literature on poverty and conflict in 
Ethiopia, the two conditions have often been treated as separate branches of academic 
inquiry. Poverty has traditionally been a concern of development studies and economics 
while conflict has been the preserve of conflict and peace studies (Goodhand, 2001). 
However, the challenges of the twenty-first century have revealed the intertwining 
characteristics of poverty and violence. According to Stewart (2000), the post-Cold War 
era has witnessed the complex and interlinked challenges of poverty and conflict. Any 
strategy to tackle poverty must also work to transform conflicts while poverty alleviation 
programs and development strategies can’t afford to neglect issues related to conflict. 
The overall aim of this research will be helping create a comprehensive and 
multidisciplinary approach to conflict resolution that simultaneously addresses the 
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sources of violence and poverty. Understanding the two-way relationship between 
poverty and conflict would help to develop a new framework that brings peacebuilding 
and development closer. 
Research Hypothesis 
 The research paper assumes that there is a two-way causal relationship between 
poverty and conflict within the context of Region 5, Ethiopia. 
1.  When deprivation and inequality coincide with the social identities of people, 
they can be a strong source of collective grievance which can translate into violence. 
2. Armed conflict can lead to poverty by destroying and diminishing the human, 
physical, economic, social, and natural capitals of households and diverting national 
resources from development to military activities. 
Limitations of the study 
 There are two limitations that need to be acknowledged in this research. The first 
limitation concerns the multidisciplinary aspect of this study. For a long period of time, 
poverty and conflict have been subject matters covered by multiple disciplines. Any 
study that tries to establish a relationship between these two complex variables requires 
more experience and expertise around multiple fields of studies. The second limitation 
refers to the time and resources allowed for conducting the research. Although the study 
area only covers a single region of Ethiopia, the nature of the two-way relationship 
between poverty and conflict is a complex subject matter that would have been better 
approached with more time and resources. 
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2. Background Information 
Ethiopia: Geographic and Demographic Background  
Located in the Eastern part of Africa, present day Ethiopia is a land-locked state  
bordered by Eritrea in the north, Sudan in the west and southwest, Somalia in the east 
and southeast, Kenya in the south, and Djibouti in the east ( Figure 1). It covers a total 
area of 472,000 square miles, which is close to twice the size the of France. Ethiopia has 
an estimated population of  85 million (2008 estimate), the second most populous 
country in Africa. Christianity and Islam get about equal share with each claiming 
around 45 percent of the total population (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2010). 
According to Gutu (2008), Ethiopia is home to about eighty ethnic groups that vary in 
population size from a thousand to about 18 million. The 1994 National Census Survey 
listed seventy languages spoken as mother tongues by different ethnic groups in Ethiopia 
(Central Statistics Agency [CSA], 1995). 
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Figure 1:  Map of Africa and Ethiopia 
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Region 5: Geographic and Demographic Background 
Commonly referred to as Region 5, the Somali Regional State is one of nine 
federal regions of Ethiopia. It is located in the southeastern part of the country 
bordering Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti. The region also shares borders with other 
Ethiopian regional states namely, Oromia (Region 4) and Afar (Region 2). Although 
Region 5 is part of the Ethiopian administration, it maintains strong historical, cultural, 
and economic ties with neighboring Somalia. The region is often referred to as 
“Ogaden”, named after its majority Somali clan, the "Ogadeni” (Lewis, 2004).  
Region 5 obtained its current shape in 1994 after Ethiopia adopted an ethnic 
based federal state system to reflect the distribution of the various ethnic groups found 
within its territory (Figure 2). Ethnic identity was employed to draw the boundaries 
between administrative regions. Thus, the land inhabited by ethnic Somalis became the 
“Somali Regional State” or Region 5. Similarly, territories populated by other major 
ethnic groups like the “Oromos”, “Amharas”, and “Tigres” became Oromia Regional 
State (Region 4), Amhara Regional State (Region 3), and Tigray Regional State  
(Region 1) respectively (Alemayehu, 2004). 
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Region 5 covers a total area of 105,000 square miles with a population of 3.9 
million (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], 2008). According to CSA (1999), ninety-
six percent of the population is of Somali descent. The inhabitants are commonly 
referred to as “Ethiopian-Somalis” to distinguish them from ethnic Somalis living in 
mainland Somalia.
1
 Although the two groups occupy the opposite sides of an 
international border, Ethiopian-Somalis in Region 5 and Somalis living in Somalia have 
the same ethnic origin, culture, and history. Most of the major clan-families found 
within Somalia including “Darood”, “Hawiye”, “Dir”, “Issa”, “Rahaweyn”, and ethnic 
“Bantus” are also present in Region 5 with varying proportions (Eno, 2008). 
Region 5: Climate and Livelihood 
With  temperatures reaching over one hundred degrees Fahrenheit and annual 
rainfall averaging between 12-19 Inches per year, Region 5 falls under arid and semi-
arid agro-ecological and climatic zones (Gebre-Mariam, 2005). The way of life in the 
region is a reflection of the coping strategies adopted by its inhabitants to meet the 
challenges of a harsh and fragile ecosystem. The livelihoods of most Ethiopian-Somalis 
primarily revolve around animal husbandry. They are mainly nomadic pastoralists and 
agro-pastoralists engaged in livestock production or a mix of livestock and crop 
production. The nomadic way of life serves as an adaptive strategy to the complex 
                                                 
1
 The Republic of Somalia was formed in 1960 by a merger of two former colonial 
territories, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. The country remained intact until 
1991 when the central government collapsed amidst an on-going civil war. 
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environmental vulnerability of the region. Sedentary agriculture is practiced to a lesser 
extent within river valleys (Baroud, 2003).  
The Horn of Africa: Geographic Background 
The Horn of Africa is a tusk shaped geographical region found in the 
Northeastern corner of Africa (Figure 3). Its name comes from a geopolitical term that 
was coined during the Cold War in reference to Somalia and Ethiopia. Through time, the 
usage has expanded to include the neighboring countries of Eritrea, Djibouti, and parts 
of Sudan (Lunn, 2008) and covers 741,316 square miles (Kalib, 2007). Since the mid-
1990s, the term, “Greater Horn of Africa”2 is applied to add Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Burundi, and Tanzania to the list. By all forms of designation, Region 5 forms an 
important sub-region of the Horn of Africa. Although it is part of the Ethiopian domain, 
Region 5 represents a crossroad territory that has been shaped by socio-political and 
historic developments in the Horn of Africa.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 This term has been widely used since the U.S foreign policy proposal, “The Greater 
Horn of Africa Initiative” kicked off in 1994. For more information, refer to 
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/ghai/ 
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Figure 3: The Horn of Africa 
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The Horn of Africa: Historical Background 
Throughout its history, the Horn of Africa has been an important geo-political 
region for its long stretch of shoreline along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. For 
centuries, the region has attracted numerous foreign powers that wanted to secure their 
maritime trade routes. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the strategic value of 
the region became even more prominent among countries involved in international trade.  
It brought competing European powers like Britain, France, and Italy onto the scene. 
Egypt and Ethiopia were also two African powers that played significant roles in the 
region’s political process. It was, however, the British who took the first step to 
safeguard the Red Sea route. Britain established a garrison in Aden, Yemen in 1839. At 
the time, Britain was prepared to deter any power from obtaining posts along the African 
coastline. Intense competition came from France, which secured a foothold at the Port of 
Obock in present-day Djibouti in 1862. Britain reacted by establishing protectorates in 
parts of what is today Somaliland (Northern Somalia) and Region 5. The Italians 
followed by expanding along the Eritrean coastline in 1885 and later setting up their 
protectorate in Southern Somalia (Henze, 2000).  
Ethiopia not only survived the “Scramble for Africa”3 but at the same time 
expanded its frontiers to areas never before reached. By combining diplomatic and 
                                                 
3
  The Scramble for Africa (1880-1900) was the rapid colonization and partition of the 
African continent among European imperial powers. It was driven by the economic, 
social, and political changes that took place in Europe during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Ethiopia was the only African nation to maintain its independence 
during the “scramble for Africa” by utilizing its military and diplomatic powers. 
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military tactics, Ethiopia laid claims and conquered Somali-inhabited areas of the Horn, 
most of which are parts of today’s Region 5 (Zewdie, 2001). In 1897, Ethiopia also 
negotiated an important border treaty with Britain that ceded land in Region 5 (Ogaden 
and the Haud areas). According to Lewis (2004), 1897 remains a crucial year for the 
history of the Horn; the partition of the Somali inhabited territory of the Horn of Africa 
was complete, and Somalis were divided between five geographical units. These were 
British-Somaliland, Italy-Somaliland, French-Somaliland (later Djibouti), Ogaden 
(Region 5), and the Northern Front District in British-East Africa (later Kenya). 
Ethiopia entered the twentieth century as an independent and sovereign state. 
But, it was only a matter of time before it was conquered by Italy in 1935. In 1940, Italy 
entered the Second World War and joined the Axis Alliance with Germany and Japan. It 
soon declared war on Great Britain and annexed British Somaliland in the Horn of 
Africa. The Italians then adjoined Eritrea, Ethiopia, British Somaliland, and Italy 
Somaliland to establish the “Africa Orientale Italiana-AOI” or the Italian East African 
Empire (See Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 Poverty and Conflict                                                                                                      15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
                 Figure 4: Map of Italy-East Africa Empire (1940) 
 
 
 
 Poverty and Conflict                                                                                                      16 
 
 
The empire was however short-lived as British and the Commonwealth forces drove out 
the Italians not only from British Somaliland but also from the entire Italian East African 
Empire in 1941 (Mohamud-Abdi, 2007). Italy’s defeat temporarily brought most of the 
Somali-speaking territories in the Horn of Africa under the British Military 
Administration (BMA). In 1954, Britain restored Region 5 to Ethiopia based on the 
Border Agreement of 1897. In 1960, British Somaliland and Italy Somaliland merged to 
form the Republic of Somalia (Lewis, 1994). 
One of the impacts of colonialism during the twentieth century was the growth of 
national consciousness among Somalis living in the Horn of Africa. The emergence of 
groups like the Somali Youth Coalition (SYC) and Somali Youth League ( SYL) in the 
1940s and 1950s  became prototypes of Somali nationalism. These movements called 
not only for independence from foreign occupation but also unity among Somali 
communities found in different parts of the Horn of Africa (Barnes, 2007). For these 
nationalists, the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Border Agreement and the 1954 territorial 
concession of Region 5 to Ethiopia partitioned the ethnic homeland of the Somali nation.  
As will be seen in later sections, these two events are linked with the various domestic 
and international conflicts that erupted in Region 5 during the second half of twentieth 
century.  
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3. The Dynamics of Armed Conflict in Region 5 (1960-2010) 
 Region 5 has historically been a contentious region of the world with multiple 
forms of violent conflicts. Healy (2008) argues that barely a single decade can be 
identified in the last one hundred years when Ethiopia and Somalia did not experience 
armed conflict.
4
 These conflicts have  occurred at various levels ranging from local 
clashes to conventional warfare  involving states and non-state actors. McGinnis (1999) 
points out that these multi-level conflicts often overlap with one another, creating a 
complex conflict trend in the region. The past and present conflicts of the region are part 
of a more broad and complex framework linking local, regional, and international 
factors.   
 The underlying causes of conflict in the region are complex. Various factors 
have been identified as root causes of conflict by commentators and policy makers. 
These include clan politics, ethnicity, religion, ideology, environmental insecurity, 
struggle for productive resources, viability and legitimacy of failed and emergent states, 
and outside intervention (Creative Associates International [CAI], 2008). Although these 
variables remain important components of the regional conflict complex, one has to also 
understand the unique setting under which these variables intract to generate multi-
facetted conflicts.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Ethiopia (Region 5) and Somalia cover a greater portion of the Horn of Africa. 
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Armed Conflicts in Region 5  
 Region 5 represents a crossroad territory that has been heavily influenced by 
events in both Ethiopia and Somalia. According to Hagmann (2007), the region has for a 
long time been a buffer zone where Ethiopian and Somali, global, and local forces clash 
with one another. For the last five decades, it has staged numerous organized conflicts in 
the form of domestic insurgencies, interstate conflicts, and transnational conflicts. 
Although the fault line between these conflicts often remains elusive, violence maintains 
a systemic presence in the region.  
 In recent years, Region 5 has been known for its frequent humanitarian crisis in 
context of an on-going civil war and regional instability. The primary armed group 
currently fighting the Ethiopian government is the Ogaden National Liberation Front 
(ONLF), a separatist rebel movement founded in 1984. The ONLF (2009) describes 
itself as a vanguard organization leading the “struggle of the people of Ogaden”  
(Region 5) in a quest for self-determination.
5
 Although the civil conflict has been going 
on for years through intermittent hostilities, it gained a dramatic momentum in the year 
2007 after the ONLF enhanced its attacks against the Ethiopian government.
6
 This was 
followed by a massive and brutal counterinsurgency mission by government forces that 
                                                 
5
 Region 5 is traditionally referred as “Ogaden”, named after its majority clan, 
“Ogadeen”. 
6
 In April 2007, the ONLF attacked a Chinese-run oil field in Abole, Region 5 killing 
more than sixty-five Ethiopian and nine Chinese oil workers. The Ethiopian government 
responded by launching a brutal counterinsurgency campaign (HRW, 2008a). 
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has exacerbated the humanitarian situation in the region (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 
2008a).  
 It should be noted that the forerunner to today’s ONLF was the Narsulla uprising 
or the Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF).
7
 The movement was born in 1963 under close 
aid from Somalia’s newly independent government (Mohamud Abdi, 2007). Somalia 
was formed in 1960 through a merger of the British protectorate of Somaliland and the 
Italian colonies of Northeastern and South Somalia. In the aftermath of its independence, 
the new government was determined to incorporate all Somali speaking population of 
East Africa under a single Pan-Somali state.
8
 For Somali nationalists, independence was 
an important first step towards creating a Somali nation-state that would ultimately 
encompass Somalis in Ethiopia (Region 5), French-Somaliland (Djibouti), and northern 
Kenya (Lunn, 2008).  One of the strategies adopted for achieving this was to support 
dissident movements in Ethiopia's Region 5 and other neighboring countries of the 
Horn.  
  In 1963, Somalia’s military support for the OLF rose to the point where it drew a 
countermove from the Ethiopian side. This spilled into a brief conventional war between 
                                                 
7
 The Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF) should not be confused with the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF), a rebel insurgency founded in 1973 and fighting for the freedom 
of Oromia Regional State (Region 4) from Ethiopia’s rule. 
8
 The nationalist scheme was enshrined in the constitution and symbolically represented 
in the new flag which featured a five pointed star-each star point representing the five 
territories claimed by the Somali nation; British Somaliland, Italy Somaliland, Northern 
Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya, French Somaliland (Djibouti), and Region 5 (Ogaden) 
in Ethiopia. 
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Somalia and Ethiopia until a ceasefire was brokered in 1964 (Deng & Zartman, 1991).  
After a decade of withdrawal, Somalia continued its support to the rebels by helping 
recreate the OLF under a new name, Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). In 1976, 
WSLF  intensified its military activities in Region 5. A year later, Somalia aligned its 
national army alongside WSLF forces once again transforming the intrastate conflict 
into an interstate rivalry. Somalia’s direct military involvement started in July 1977, and 
helped bring most of  Region 5 under its control. It also marked the onset of the Cold 
War in the Horn of Africa (Haileselassie, 1981). 
The Effects of the Cold War 
 The Cold War divided much of the world into two spheres of ideological 
influences, one mandated from Washington and the other from Moscow. Throughout the 
course of the Cold War, the superpowers were never directly engaged in armed conflict 
in their own territories. Instead, the vast majority of wars fought during these days were 
fought in territories of the periphery, the developing world where basic human needs 
were rarely or barely satisfied (Lederach, 1997). The 1977-78 Ethio-Somali war was a 
Cold War era conflict that took place in one of the poorest regions of the world. It also 
added a new layer onto the already complex conflict dynamics of the region. Until the 
mid-1970s, Somalia and Ethiopia were the military beneficiaries of  the Soviet Union 
and United States respectively. However, Ethiopia’s ideological shift towards the East 
bloc and Somalia’s demarche to the West changed the reality. The shift of alliance was 
to Ethiopia’s advantage as the country benefited from massive shipment of Soviet 
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armaments and Cuban military personnel. This quickly changed the balance of forces on 
the ground. By March 1978, Ethiopia was able to push back Somali and WSLF forces 
and recovered all of Region 5 (Keller, 1998). 
The Cold War significantly altered the conflict dynamics of Region 5. Following 
Ethiopia’s victory, the WSLF’s operation in Region 5 began to weaken. According to 
Lockyer (2006), by 1980, the WSLF fell in “frequency, size, and sophistication to a 
level that no longer made it a genuine threat to the Ethiopian regime” (p.3). In 1984, a 
splinter group of the WSLF, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) emerged by 
promoting Ogaden’s (Region 5)  independence as opposed to Pan-Somalism. This was a 
political shift from an ethnic (Somali) to a clan-based (Ogadeni) movement. As stated in 
the beginning of this section, ONLF is still an active insurgency group in Region 5.  
 The Cold War also carried long-term political consequences for the Horn of 
Africa. The impacts were more devastating for Somalia as it set the stage for years of 
civil violence and disorder. According to Ahmed & Green (1999), the Ethio-Somali 
conflict has been interpreted by some as the single most important turning point for 
Somalia. It sowed the seed of future internal conflicts, prompting the rise of several 
Somali rebel movements to overthrow the regime. However, by beginning of 
1990s, none of these competing factions were strong enough to assume central power 
(Moller, 2009). The political fragmentation left Somalia without a functioning 
government since 1991. 
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The Changing Aspects of Organized Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Period  
 The nature of organized conflicts has evolved in the Post-Modern period as many 
have become conflicts without borders involving both state and non-state actors. The 
flourishing of insurgent groups that span international boundaries and the cross-border 
intervention of states in adjacent civil wars mark the two important characteristics of 
organized conflicts in the post-Cold War period (McGinnis, 1999).  
 According to Lindbergh & Melvin (2007), Islamist militant groups are regarded 
as “archetypal transnational organizations” because their mode of operation often 
transcends state boundaries and challenges the conventional approach to state security 
(n.p.). One such coalition that formed in the early nineties in Somalia was Al-Ittihad-
Islamiyya. The group began asserting its presence in Ethio-Somali border areas in the 
early1990s. It sought to liberate Region 5 from Ethiopia’s rule, but unlike past resistance 
movements, it also wanted to establish an Islamic political order in the Horn of Africa 
(International Crisis Group [ICG], 2005). Al-Ittihad-Islamiyya was supported by Islamic 
charities in the Gulf States and had a military wing that largely consisted of veterans 
returning from Afghanistan’s Mujahidin forces in late 1980s and early 90s                         
(Bryden,2005).  
 The recent Ethiopian invasion of Somalia also marks another changing feature of 
organized conflicts in the region. In December of 2006, Ethiopian troops crossed into 
Somalia to help the weak Somali interim government oust the Islamic militia group, 
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The Transitional Federal Government (TGF) of Somalia 
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was formed in 2004 in Kenya under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development in East Africa [IGAD] (Lunn, 2008). Despite its recognition by some 
international bodies like the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), the 
government lacked any meaningful control of Somalia. Its main challenge came from 
the UIC which started to control major areas of the country beginning in 2006.  
 According to Cliffe (1999), the majority of modern day conflicts in the Horn of 
Africa have always been amplified by a pattern of mutual state interventions by 
neighboring states. Although this has been a common trend of organized conflicts in the 
past, the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia was a big change in the region’s conflict 
dynamics. Kalib (2007) adds, “In all the wars that the countries of the region have 
fought against each other, never before has the army of one side enter the capital city of 
another and engage in urban warfare” (n.p.). 
 The real motive behind Ethiopia's invasion can be approached from different 
angles. First, the UIC has lent some support to Ethiopia's main insurgent groups 
including the ONLF. In addition to this, Ethiopia believed that its northern neighbor 
Eritrea, having fought a two year war
9
 with Ethiopia (1998-2000) was engaged in a 
proxy war by helping ONLF and UIC inside Somalia. Ethiopia is also a key partner of 
the U.S War on Terror as part of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-
HOA). The United States has repeatedly insisted on a link between UIC and Al-Qaeda 
                                                 
9
 Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a two year (1998-2000) war over a disputed border. 
Although direct fight has ceased through international intervention, the boundary 
conflict remains unsolved. 
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and that there is the potential of Somalia being used as a staging ground for international 
terrorism. The U.S. hence tacitly supported Ethiopia’s invasion in material and logistic 
terms (Slavin, 2007). Unfortunately, the military intervention which ended in 2008 has 
resulted in greater insecurity in the Horn of Africa and one of worst humanitarian crises 
in Somalia.   
Summary 
 Region 5 represents an interface zone which has been greatly shaped by 
historical events in both Ethiopia and Somalia. Throughout its modern history, the 
region has been a theatre for organized conflicts that played out in various local, 
national, and international wars fought among state and non-state actors. These conflicts 
are interlocked with one another with a blurred line of distinction. What started as a 
local rebellion by OLF in 1963 was also a closely supported mission by neighboring 
Somalia from its very beginning. At the time, Somalia was a new state formed from a 
merger of former British and Italian colonies. Upon its independence, Somalia was 
embarked on a mission to unite all Somali inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa, one 
of them being Region 5. However, Somalia’s intervention shifted the local rebellion into 
an interstate conflict. As a result, two conventional wars were fought between Somalia 
and Ethiopia in 1963 and 1976. The second Ethio-Somali War (1976-78) became part of 
the Cold War as the superpowers were drawn into it. It was a large scale conflict with 
long-term impacts for both Somalia and Ethiopia. The effect was stronger on Somalia’s 
side as it led to the collapse of the central government in 1991. Somalia’s statelessness 
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in turn brought security challenges for Ethiopia as the former became a host for local 
insurgencies and some transnational militant groups. This challenge comes on top of the 
growing local insurgency that is mounted by the ONLF, a predecessor of the OLF. 
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4. Defining the Research Variables: Poverty and Armed Conflict 
Although poverty and conflict are different phenomena that plague many 
societies, the effect of one on the other has recently become the subject of much research 
(Draman, 2003). The main objective of this research paper is to analyze the two way 
association between poverty and armed conflict in Region 5. However, the poverty-
conflict nexus is a complex subject that goes beyond the direct, cause-effect relationship. 
Both armed conflict and poverty are multidimensional concepts with no universally set 
meanings. They are defined through changing parameters in space and time. It is 
therefore imperative to have a clear understanding of these two variables before 
analyzing their two-way connection. The aim is not to create a new perspective but to 
build a framework that goes beyond the conventional meanings of both poverty and 
armed conflict. 
Poverty 
 Poverty is perhaps one of the most complex concepts from which to derive a 
universal definition. In the past five decades, various terms have been used to describe 
poverty namely, income poverty, human underdevelopment, social exclusion, ill-being, 
lack of capability and functioning, vulnerability, livelihood unsustainablility, lack of 
basic needs, and relative deprivation (Maxwell, 1999). Despite this richness in 
vocabulary, there still lacks a coherent functional framework to define poverty. This is 
due to the multidimensional aspect of poverty which can only be captured by employing 
different indicators. 
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 Objective Aspects of Poverty 
Globally, poverty is estimated along a uniform reference poverty line expressed 
in common unit (income). For the purpose of global aggregation and comparison, the 
World Bank uses reference lines set at $1.25 and $2.00 (2005 Purchasing Power Parity-
PPP) to express “extreme poverty” and “poverty” respectively (World Bank, 2008). The 
United Nations Development Fund [UNDP] (2007) has also developed another measure 
- Human Development Index (HDI) to measure the level of human development in each 
country. Its measurement employs a comprehensive index (HDI) which integrates three 
dimensions of human security; household income, life expectancy, and adult literacy.
10
 
 By most objective measures, Ethiopia is one of least developed countries of the 
world. According to a World Bank (2009) data, Ethiopia was 197
th
 in a list of 210 
countries ranked by their Gross National Incomes (GNI- PPP) for the year 2008. The 
UNDP (2007) also ranked Ethiopia at 169
th
 place out of 177 countries measured by their 
2005 HDI. The same report found that 77.5 percent of Ethiopians fall below the income 
poverty line of  $2 /day while 39 percent of the population were in extreme poverty, 
earning less than a dollar a day.  
Subjective Aspects of Poverty  
 Poverty is a matter of deprivation, but the way people perceive and respond to it 
varies in space and time. As Barash and Webel (2004) posited, one of the most 
                                                 
10
 For more details on HDI and how it is calculated, refer to: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/ 
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important, if least recognized, aspects of poverty is its psychological dimension which 
shapes our perception of deprivation and inequality. Although poverty can be measured 
objectively using widely accepted indices, it remains crucial to assess it from a social 
angle. Often, individuals and groups measure their social and economic well-being 
without the absolute economic standards like income and food consumption. They 
measure their well-being by relating their socio-economic status with other individuals 
or groups. This refers to the subjective analysis of one’s well-being according to the 
expectations or standards set by a given society. It is this subjective view of poverty that 
is crucial when studying its relationship with violence. This is because it is not just the 
condition of being without adequate food or shelter that automatically translates to 
violence but the social consciousness surrounding this deprivation.
11
 
Armed Conflict 
 Conflict studies literature of the Cold War era defined armed conflict on the 
basis of selective parameters. According to Brozoska (2007), the traditional conception 
of armed conflict focused on areas of government involvement, political objective, and 
military casualty at its core. In contrast, post-Cold War conflicts in Region 5 and in 
many parts of  Sub-Saharan Africa have often been outside of this realm. Armed 
violence is common in disputes involving state and non-state actors with or without a 
political motive and, in most cases, civilians are the main causalities.  
                                                 
11
 Goodland (2001) states that the absolute measures of poverty are less significant than 
the poor people’s expectations and sense of grievance. 
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 The pattern of conflicts in the post-Cold War period has changed the general 
meaning of armed violence. The increasing number of non-state actors
12
 involved, the 
deliberate killing of civilians, and the sophisticated method of arms financing have all 
called into question the validity of the traditional concept of armed conflict. According 
to Oyebade (1998), one of the implications of the fall of the Cold War is that it has 
created a new perspective from which to view conflicts and their resolution. To this end, 
one of the most widely used data-source on global armed conflicts, the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP), has revised its definition of armed conflict by adding “non-state 
conflicts” and “one-sided violence” to its global database of armed conflicts.13 Non-state 
conflict involves the use of armed forces between two organized groups, neither of 
which is the government of a state, resulting in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths 
in a year. One-sided violence refers the use of armed force by the government of a state 
or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least twenty-five 
deaths in a year (UCDP, 2010). 
Another conflict analysis tool, the Conflict Barometer, was developed in 1993 by 
the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. It captures some of the 
                                                 
12
 private armies, communal groups, and terrorist groups 
13
 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) collects information on armed violence 
that occurred after 1946. Data on armed conflicts have been published yearly in the 
report series, States in Armed Conflict since 1987, in the SIPRI Yearbook since 1988, 
the Journal of Peace Research since 1993, and in the Human Security Reports since 
2005. Starting 2004, the UCDP also operates and continuously updates its online 
database on armed conflicts and organized violence. The UCDP data is a widely used on 
global armed conflicts and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard in how 
conflicts are systematically defined and studied (UCDP, 2010). 
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changing natures of collective violence in the post-Modern period.This model focuses 
on the intensity levels of violence, separating conflict into two major categories: non-
violent and violent. Non-violent conflict consists of latent and manifest conflicts while 
violent conflicts scale from crisis to severe crisis, and war (Conflict Barometer 2008, 
2008) (See table 1). 
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   Table 1 
   Conflict Intensities  
State of 
Violence 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-
Violent 
 
 
 
 
Violent 
Intensity 
Group 
 
 
 
Low 
 
Level of 
intensity 
Name of 
intensity 
Latent 
Conflict 
Definition 
1 
 
A positional difference over 
definable values of national meaning 
is considered to be a latent conflict if 
demands are articulated by one of the 
parties and perceived by the other as 
such. 
2 Manifest 
Conflict 
A manifest conflict includes 
measures that are preliminary to the 
use of violent force. This includes 
verbal pressure, threatening explicitly 
with violence, or the imposition of 
economic sanctions. 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
 
 
 High 
3 Crisis A crisis is a tense situation in which 
at least one of the parties uses violent 
force in sporadic incidents. 
 
4 Severe 
Crisis 
A conflict is considered to be a 
severe crisis if violent force is used 
repeatedly in an organized way. 
5 War A war is a violent conflict in which 
violent force is used with certain 
continuity in an organized and 
systematic way. The conflict parties 
exercise extensive measures and the 
extent of destruction is massive and 
of long duration. 
Note. From Conflict Barometer: 17
th
 Annual Conflict Analysis 2008 (p.1), Heidelberg       
Institute for International Conflict Research, 2008 by Heideberg University.  
 Poverty and Conflict                                                                                                      32 
 
 
Organized and Communal Conflicts 
 For the greater part of its modern history, the Horn of Africa has staged 
numerous violent conflicts that set states against states and communities against 
communities (Wasara, 2002). Considering the reality in Region 5, armed conflicts have 
occurred under all three categories of violent conflicts (crisis, severe crisis, and war) in 
the last five decades. For the purpose of this study, violent conflicts can be categorized 
based on the organizational structure of the conflicting parties. We can classify armed 
conflict along two lines: organized conflict and communal conflict.
14
 Organized conflict 
involves conflicts that are carried out by structured groups that have a combat unit under 
a single military command. This is mostly carried out by the state or rebel insurgencies 
with specific political objectives. On the other hand, communal conflict refers to 
sporadic incidents of violence taking place between or within communities. It refers to 
violence that erupts at the community level without the use of a specially assigned and 
trained unit for warfare. One example of this can be inter-clan or intra-clan conflict that 
takes place without the involvement of other organized groups. This study follows 
UCDP’s (2010) definition of armed conflict and focuses only on organized conflicts.15 
                                                 
 
15
 An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year in one of the 
conflict’s dyads. A dyad is made up of two armed and opposing actors. In state-based 
conflicts a dyad is defined as two actors, with one or more being the government, that 
have a stated incompatibility. In a non-state conflict, a dyad is constructed by at least 
two organized actors, of which none is the government of a state, that oppose each other 
with arms (UCDP, 2010). 
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Summary  
  Both Poverty and conflict are dynamic concepts with meanings that shift over 
time. “What is poverty?” or “what constitutes an armed conflict?” are questions that find 
different answers with time. For any study that is analyzing the cyclical relationship 
between these two variables, it is important to frame them within the context of the 
study region. This research paper conceptualized poverty from bottom-up; that is, from 
the subjective experience of people. The social perception of poverty goes beyond the 
economic well-being of people and captures hidden dimensions of poverty. The other 
research variable, armed conflict is placed under a new framework that addresses the 
changing nature of violence in the Post-Modern world. It was divided into two groups 
(organized conflicts and communal conflicts) based on the organization structure of the 
conflicting parties in Region 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Poverty and Conflict                                                                                                      34 
 
 
5. Literature Review 
 In the post-Cold War era, more and more studies are pointing the fact that 
poverty and conflict have a two-way causal relationship. This portion of the study will 
examine the literature that explores the relationship between poverty and conflict and 
that advocates the significance of studying such relationships. The following sections 
will review four critical areas of this study: (1) The vicious cycle between poverty and 
conflict 2) The impact of poverty at the onset of conflict 3) The effect of conflict at the 
onset of poverty, and 4) The closing gap between peace and development. 
The Vicious Cycle between Poverty and Conflict 
 There is growing international literature on the relationship between poverty and 
conflict that studies the changing nature of armed conflicts and the extent to which 
poverty can be regarded as both a cause and an effect of conflict. Peace and conflict 
researchers increasingly recognize that poverty, underdevelopment, and high levels of 
inequality are all high risk factors for armed conflict. On the other side of this 
relationship, armed conflicts entail a range of economic and social damages that push 
societies into poverty. These include the loss of life, physical and intellectual 
disabilities, mass displacement of civilians, destruction of physical and economic 
infrastructures, and diversion of expenditures from development projects to the military 
sector (Hillyard, Rolston, & Tomlinston, 2005). 
 According to John Prendergast, endemic poverty and wide inequalities of income 
are often reliable predictors of conflict in Ethiopia’s Region 5. Poverty has severely 
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limited opportunities in education, access to resources, and economic advancement in 
the region. When poverty is combined with deep social and economic inequalities, the 
struggle for scarce resources trigger violent conflicts in the region. The central role of 
the state in determining the resource allocation between regions has made it a major 
target of conflict in the last five decades (Lederach, 1997). 
 Region 5 is characterized by longstanding conflict between government forces 
and local armed rebel groups. The region has long suffered from the effects of violent 
conflict that has severely undermined the ability of the public sector to deliver basic 
social services to most of its population. It has also led to the destruction of physical and 
economic infrastructures causing widespread poverty in the region (Gele & Bjune, 
2010). 
  Although the causal relationship between poverty and conflict is far from 
simple, research has shown that poor countries are at a higher risk of experiencing 
violent conflicts. At the same time, the excessive numbers of violent conflicts taking 
place in Least Developed Countries (LDC) are the main sources of poverty. According 
to the UN (2004), in the 1970s and 1980s, over forty percent of countries affected by 
civil conflicts were LDCs. The proportion increased to fifty percent during the period 
1990-95 and fifty-eight percent in 1996-2001 (UN, 2004). 
 While there is no automatic linkage between poverty and conflict, an 
accumulating body of evidence suggests that their relationship runs in both directions. 
Violent conflict reinforces poverty by disrupting societies and rolling back human 
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development gains built up over generations. Similarly, poverty is part of the cycle that 
creates and perpetuates violent conflicts in LDCs. Poverty and violent conflict 
systematically reinforce each other and for many societies, the conflict trap is part of the 
poverty trap (UNDP, 2005). 
  Copson (1991) uses a similar argument in highlighting the two-way linkage 
between poverty and conflict in Africa. The author points out the continuing prospect for 
violent conflict outbreaks in countries affected by poverty, social cleavage, and 
repressive government policies. Copson also underscores the difficulty to foresee 
economic or social development across Africa until the burden of violent conflicts ends. 
 The poverty-conflict hypothesis is still a new area of study that is attracting 
research from disciplines like social psychology, conflict resolution, political economics, 
and development studies. Despite a general consensus on the direct and indirect impacts 
of conflict on poverty, there still remains a disagreement on the primary conflict 
triggering effects of poverty. Kanbur (2007) states that the causality from conflict to 
poverty is not much in doubt as violence destroys or impairs incentives for development. 
In contrast, the precise nature of causality in the other direction, from poverty to conflict 
is more ambiguous and subject to a greater debate. 
The Impact of Poverty on the Onset of Conflict  
 For years, a debate has raged in academic circles over the principal sources of 
conflict. While there still remain some disagreements about the causes of conflict, many 
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studies show that the overwhelming majority of civil wars erupt in countries suffering 
from persistent poverty or sharp economic decline (Rice, Graff, & Lewis, 2006). 
 According to Catholic Relief Services [CRS] (2010), seventy-three percent of 
the poorest billion people in the world have lived through a violent conflict or are 
embroiled in conflict now. Poverty breeds hopelessness and frustration among people 
and makes them, especially the young and unemployed, more vulnerable to calls for 
violence.   
 According to Lederach (1997), the majority of armed conflicts take place on the 
margins of societies that are struggling with poverty, inequality, and underdevelopment. 
They also occur in territories where basic necessities such as housing, health, and 
education are rarely or barely satisfied. The Horn of Africa represents one of these 
regions where the lack of basic human needs faced by certain segments of society serves 
as a predisposing factor for armed conflicts (Lederach, 1997).  
 While violent conflict is not confined to the global south, a disproportionate 
share of armed conflicts take place in poor countries. More than half of the countries in 
Africa are affected by at least one form of armed conflict. These conflicts are not 
temporary emergencies and have systemic and enduring features. The chronically poor 
increasingly live in contexts of chronic insecurity (Goodhand, 2001).  
 In the last two decades, poverty and conflict have become the biggest challenges 
to sustainable development around the world. Poverty plays an important role in 
triggering and sustaining armed conflicts, and it is often cited as one of the principal 
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factors responsible for instability in many parts of Africa. In 2002, thirty-eight of the 
sixty-four low-income countries around the world were associated with armed conflict: 
all of them were Sub-Saharan African countries (Draaman, 2003). 
 A large majority of the poor across the globe is affected by widespread violence 
and conflict. Many studies of civil war point to low per capita income as a strong factor 
in the outbreak of conflict. The role of economic factors in the outbreak and duration of 
civil wars has attracted the attention of many scholars from various disciplines. Some of 
these studies have drawn attention to the relationship between conflict and poverty. 
They highlight the significant role played by factors like resource predation and social 
grievances on the onset and duration of civil conflict (Justino, 2008).  
 Although poverty is an increasingly acknowledged causal factor of conflict, 
recent studies on civil wars are split on the actual process leading from poverty to 
conflict. According to Ballentine and Nitzschke (2006), the greater part of the academic 
debate has become polarized around the greed versus grievance dichotomy, juxtaposing 
“loot-seeking” with “justice-seeking” rebellions, and, more generally, the significance of 
economic versus socio-political drivers of civil war (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2006, p.2). 
 The two contrasting perspectives, greed and grievance, have been utilized to 
explain the onset of civil wars in the developing world. While the greed theory mainly 
receives support from economists, the grievance proposition is famous among experts of 
social psychology, development studies, and conflict resolution. According to Murshed 
and Tadjoeddi (2007), the greed rebellion theory is an economic explanation of civil war 
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which argues that domestic conflicts stem from the self serving motive of rebel groups 
whose major goal is to illegally capture natural resources like oil, diamonds, and timber. 
Some of the actions suggested for ending such conflicts include limiting the income-
generating means of rebels. The other argument, the grievance model, states that relative 
deprivation and the grievance it produces is the main source of conflict. People mobilize 
against their governments in response to current or anticipated deprivation. The social, 
economic, and political marginalization of people results in mass frustration which can 
translate into violence. One of the solutions suggested for ending such conflicts is to 
address the inequality line between social groups (Murshed &Tadjoeddi, 2007). 
Greed Rebellion Theory 
 The greed theory has been an influential body of knowledge used by various 
international analysts and policy makers on the onset of civil conflicts in developing 
countries. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) argue that greed is the main driving force behind 
most domestic conflicts. Their argument rests on the notion that poor countries with 
slow economic growth and a high proportion of primary commodity exports in their 
GDP face higher risks of conflict. A sluggish economic growth translates into the lack of 
employment opportunities, thus making recruitment to rebel forces much easier. On the 
other hand, a high proportion of primary commodity exports in the GDP indicate the 
availability of plunderable resources which rebels can capture to fund their warfare 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2001). 
  The greed rebellion theory finds its root in the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) 
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which is based on the assumption that human beings are rational and calculate the likely 
costs and benefits of any action. Malesevic (2004) points out that the RCT views the 
human nature as intrinsically selfish, greedy, and largely unchangeable. It assumes that 
individuals are motivated by self-interest in a world of permanent competition over 
limited resources, power, and status, and as rational individuals, they choose an 
alternative that is likely to give them the greatest satisfaction. Although the theory has 
long been a dominant paradigm in economics, it has recently gained prominence in 
various disciplines including political science and sociology (Malesevic, 2004). 
 The greed theory reflects on the economic rationality of leaders and followers, 
which find war to be more profitable than peace. Its proposition is drawn from post-Cold 
War civil conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa where armed struggle for controlling natural 
resources served as an incentive for profit-seeking groups to engage in violent behavior. 
Hence, the abundance of non-renewable natural resources in poor societies, which is 
labeled as a “resource curse” by proponents of this model, is seen as an important factor 
in igniting civil wars (Stewart, 2008). 
 Several rebel movements in Africa have been implicated with the plundering of 
natural resources through illegal taxation and cross-border smuggling. For instance, 
illicit diamonds (conflict diamonds) have been used by rebels to fund the civil wars in 
Angola, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
According to Lichbach (1995), a rebel organization has the ultimate duty of acquiring 
resources to secure the inflow of new fighters and to keep its current membership intact. 
These tasks critically depend on the rebel’s ability to offer rewards or payments to its 
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new and old members. This also explains a rebel group’s aspiration of grasping material 
wealth through illegal means. 
The attempt to benefit materially from war, through looting or other forms of 
violent accumulation, is hardly a new phenomenon. Economic considerations often 
shape the calculations and behavior of the parties to a conflict, giving rise to a particular 
war economy and a distinctive dynamic of conflict. Even where military and political 
objectives appear to provide the obvious rationale for fighting, conflicts are still likely to 
be influenced by economic motives and opportunities, especially at the local level 
(Berdal & Malone, 2000). 
Keen (1998) argues that scholars have long regarded conflict as simply, a 
breakdown in a particular system, rather than the emergence of a new, alternative system 
of profit and power. The persistence of civil war in developing nations cannot be 
explained without acknowledging the fact that internal conflict can be profitable, both 
for elites and for ordinary people involved. Hence, for significant groups both at the top 
and at the bottom of society, violence can be an opportunity for self-enrichment rather 
than a problem. 
Proponents of the greed rebellion theory strongly dismiss the notion that 
grievance is a motivating factor of civil wars. Collier (2000) argues that conflicts are far 
more likely caused by economic agendas than by grievance. Collier says, “the true cause 
of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent force of greed” 
(p.92). Although the rationale behind rebel organizations is essentially greed, the actual 
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discourse played may be entirely dominated by grievance. This is done in order to 
maintain a good public image and attract new recruits. Collier also rejects the view that 
inequality or relative deprivation is connected to civil conflicts. Collier argues that 
“inequality, whether measured in terms of income or landownership, has no effect on the 
risk of conflict...this is, of course, surprising given the attention inequality has received 
as an explanation of conflict” (p.97). 
Grievance Rebellion Theory 
 The argument of the greed rebellion theory is refuted by the grievance model 
which uses a different causal connection between poverty and conflict. Ostby (2004) 
argues that greed based studies of civil war argue that relative deprivation and grievance 
have no connection with the outbreak of civil conflicts. Ostby stresses the fact that the 
vast majority of these studies tend to concentrate exclusively on economic inequality, 
thus failing to capture the multidimensional nature of inequality. Given the fact that the 
human population is different in many respects, it is important to remember that 
inequality can be much more than just income inequality. The greed theory also uses an 
individualistic approach to inequality by focusing on inequality among individuals even 
though what it is trying to study is group conflict. This may explain why so many greed 
theorists have failed to find a relationship between relative deprivation and conflict 
(Ostby, 2004). 
 The grievance rebellion theory argues that relative deprivation and the social 
grievance it produces is the major source of armed conflict. Under the grievance 
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hypothesis, the dynamics linking poverty to conflict rest on two important steps in the 
conception of poverty. The first is the shift from the traditional, income based approach 
of poverty to a broader view which also includes social, cultural, and political 
dimensions. A single focus on the economic attribute of poverty fails to capture the 
multidimensional aspects of human well-being. The second shift refers to the swing 
from an absolute view of poverty expressed in standard economic terms to a form of 
poverty defined by values prevalent in a given society. This marks the move to relative 
poverty which focuses on how individuals perceive their relative position in society. A 
group’s access to social, economic, and political resources can be influenced by the 
relative position of its members in society. Often, the social position of individuals is 
part of a serious imbalance of opportunities that limit certain members of society from 
accessing various types of resources. The unequal status or the relative deprivation of 
some individuals and groups is an ultimate source of grievance which can translate into 
collective violence (Verstegen, 2001). 
 Despite its multidimensional characteristics, poverty implies a diminished or 
deprived access to economic, social, or cultural resources that are needed to satisfy basic 
needs. The exposure of the poor to such socio-economic conditions that stem from the 
unequal share of material and non-material resources can give rise to a distinctive 
pattern of collective behavior. Human needs theorists like Richard Burton have 
characterized such collective behavior that emerges from the denial of basic needs as 
social frustration and aggression. The failure to satisfy basic needs, according to Burton 
(1987), is a sufficient explanation of social dissidence and deviant behaviors as well as 
 Poverty and Conflict                                                                                                      44 
 
 
of political and social instabilities. Deep rooted social conflict springs from deprived 
human needs. 
 The denial of material and non-material needs have been known to cause 
frustration, prompting a possible reaction in the form of aggressive behavior. If we were 
to strictly apply the frustration-aggression theory, Opotow (2000) argues that all social 
frustrations from unmet needs can result in collective violence. However, frustration-
aggression is not a direct cause and effect relationship, and frustration doesn’t always 
result in violence. Likewise, not all violence is the result of frustration. To this end, 
Opotow employs Leonard Berkowithz's argument which points out that the effect of 
frustration on aggression is also mediated by the perception of one’s status in a larger 
system or relative to others (p.409-410).  
 Pruit (2006) states that the basic source of conflict lies in unmet needs that are 
either opposed by other party’s needs or simply deprived by another party. In spite of 
that, need deprivation is not always a sufficient cause of conflict. Often, groups can 
endure need deprivation for many years without resorting to violence. Two bodies of 
theories have been developed to explain how need deprivation produces conflict: these 
are relative deprivation theory and group mobilization theory (Pruit, 2006).  
Relative deprivation occurs when social groups subjectively perceive themselves 
as unfairly disadvantaged over other groups perceived as having similar attributes and 
deserving similar rewards (their reference groups). Relative deprivation is the outcome 
of a social comparison process whereby one group compares its socio-economic status 
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with other similar groups. The discontent arising from relative deprivation has been used 
to explain radical politics, social movements, industrial disputes, and the whole plethora 
of crime and deviance (Young, 1999). 
The concept of relative deprivation has been extensively used in social 
psychology, sociology, and other social sciences for more than six decades. The concept 
was first articulated by Stouffer and his colleagues in their wartime study, “The 
American Soldier” (1949), which found out that people evaluate their social or 
economic position not according to absolute standards but on the basis of their position 
relative to others around them. Although the concept of relative deprivation has been 
overshadowed for a long time, the post-Cold War period has seen its resurgence and its 
integration into theories of collective behavior. The concept of relative deprivation has 
since then acquired an important role in understanding the source of collective violence 
(Walker & Smith, 2002).  
Relative deprivation arises from differential access to various types of resources-
social, economic, political, or cultural. Hence, it refers to inequalities among individuals 
or groups across one or more dimensions. Social psychologists further break the concept 
of relative deprivation into egoistic deprivation and fraternal deprivation. Egoistic 
deprivation is the feeling that one individual is deprived relative to another while 
fraternal deprivation is the feeling that one's group is deprived relative to another group 
(Draman, 2003). 
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According to the group mobilization theory, there are three stages on the way to 
group action. First, individuals must strongly identify with a collective or group which 
forms an important part of their self definition. Second, there should be a perception of 
group deprivation, and the acceptance that the individual’s deprivation is part of a larger 
pattern of deprivation victimizing the whole group. The third stage is group organization 
where members assume the roles of leaders and followers and pool their actions for a 
common purpose (Pruit, 2006). 
 Based on the results from numerous case studies, Stewart (2002) discusses the 
group aspect of relative deprivation by highlighting the systematic inequalities between 
identity groups. Stewart identifies inequalities among groups that are also differentiated 
in religion, ethnicity, region, or racial affiliations as horizontal inequalities. This is 
different from the conventional approach to inequality (vertical inequality) which 
measures disparity between individuals or households. Horizontal inequalities are 
multidimensional with political, economic, and social elements. They are established 
when the lines of inequalities coincide with cultural or regional boundaries. This can be 
a source of social grievance on behalf of the deprived group. Here, cultural identities 
like ethnicity and religion can become powerful mobilizing agents leading up to 
collective violence. Disturbances arising from horizontal inequalities may take the form 
of sporadic riots, as has occurred in various cities in the U.S. during the civil rights 
movement or in civil wars, such as the Biafran and Eritrean succession wars or even 
massacres, as witnessed in Burundi and Rwanda, and local and international terrorism 
(Stewart, 2002). 
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 Horizontal inequalities refer to the group aspect of relative deprivation. Although 
the term is a new addition to the pool of development studies literature, the concept has 
long been applied by social psychologists studying group conflicts. Gurr (1991) argues 
that inequalities and discrimination along lines of ethnic and regional cleavage are 
potent sources of conflict in African societies. The denial of opportunity to reduce these 
inequalities results in collective grievance. The greater the inequalities, the more likely 
the disadvantaged groups are geared for collective action. This is particularly true if the 
inequalities are reinforced by customary and legal barriers established by dominant 
groups. Under such circumstances, communal identity provides an easy basis for 
mobilization. Where identity remains strong, it is relatively easy for political leaders 
evoking symbols of common ethnic or religious interests to propagate ideologies of 
resistance and organize group members for violent action (Gurr, 1991). 
 According to Gurr (1970), the primary causal sequence in political violence is 
first the development of discontent, second the politicization of the discontent, and 
finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors.   
“Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating 
condition for participants in collective violence” (Gurr, 1970, p. 13). 
 The perceptions of deprivation or disadvantage are usually based on inter-group 
comparisons rather than the estimation of the in-group position alone. People can 
compare their in-group with an advantaged out-group. During this process, members of 
the disadvantaged group perceive discrimination on the level of group identity rather 
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than on that of individual identity. Hence, social identity and feelings of relative 
deprivation can reinforce one another. Members of a group with a more salient social 
identity can compare their group with another group and perceive more relative 
deprivation. On the other hand, relative deprivation impacts the salience of social 
identity by increasing in-group solidarity (Korostelina, 2007). 
 Most contemporary civil wars in developing countries have ethnic dimension 
with ethnic groups fighting against one another or struggling against regimes dominated 
by other ethnic groups. According to Murshed and Gates (2003), social identity is a 
strong mobilizing force by which groups organize in pursuit of collective ends. The 
capacity of ethnicity to facilitate collective action is superior to most other organizing 
forms except religion. However, ethnicity by itself can’t produce mass violence. It 
requires a well defined grievance that can be framed through the identity group in 
question. A shared sense of relative deprivation strengthens identification with the in-
group and provides a strong base for political mobilization. That is why horizontal 
inequalities are so important in organizing groups for political violence. Political 
entrepreneurs usually seize this opportunity of inter-group inequality to add symbolic 
systems and mobilize groups for violence (Murshed & Gates, 2003).  
 In his recent study, Sen (2008) underlined the complex picture of the poverty-
violence relationship. He argued that poverty and inequality are importantly linked to 
violence and that relationship is contingent upon the social and cultural circumstances of 
the conflict setting. He added that it is the synergy between poverty and cultural 
 Poverty and Conflict                                                                                                      49 
 
 
identities that increases the significance of group inequalities and may contribute to 
violence. 
 Conflict resolution scholars have effectively applied the grievance rebellion 
theory in analyzing various civil conflicts in Africa. Copson (1991) argues that the 
second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) between the North and the South erupted as 
Southerners became aware of their region’s relative impoverishment. This became a 
source of collective grievance that mobilized Southerners (Black Africans) against the 
Northerners (Arabs). The presence of socio-economic inequalities along the line of the 
Arab/African identity was essential in bringing the two groups into conflict. 
 Rothschild (1997) also documented on the pattern of resource distribution and its 
impact in Ethiopia during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie (1930-1974). During this 
period, available developmental resources were used to promote growth only in selected 
provinces of Ethiopia. Allocations for social services like health and education were 
clustered in Shewa Province (Central Ethiopia) and the capital, Addis Ababa. This has 
led to the social and economic exclusion of large segment of the population. Rothschild 
adds, by the end of 1973, there were only eighty-five hospitals in the country, twenty-
five of which were in Shewa province and Addis Ababa. The relative deprivation of the 
hinterland was important in forming collective grievance against the government. This 
neglect of the periphery helped to ferment the 1974 revolution which overthrew the 
Emperor and intensified the regional insurgency movements (Rothchild, 1997).  
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 Horowitz (1985) states how colonial rule in Africa shaped group relations and 
made ethnic identity a more important matter than it might otherwise have been. 
Colonial rule entailed a differential recruitment of ethnic groups into new roles that set 
new standards of group worth in many African societies. The differential distribution of 
opportunities and resources between ethnic groups has led to an emergence of dual 
groups labeled as “advanced” and “backward” groups. The disproportionate 
representation of some ethnic groups in the modern social, economic, and political 
sectors meant the deprivation of others. One of the important factors that have produced 
an extraordinary amount of conflict in many African countries is the juxtaposition of 
“backward” or deprived groups with “advanced” or privileged groups (Horowitz, 1985, 
p.147). 
The Impact of Conflict on the Onset of Poverty 
 If poverty leads to insecurity, it is also true that the destabilizing effects of 
conflict constitute a major factor of poverty. Poverty is both a cause of conflict and a 
consequence of it. Conflict imposes a substantial cost on a nation’s economy and on the 
welfare of its citizens. It can result in as many as thirty percent more people living in 
poverty (Brainard, Chellet, & LaFleur, 2007).  
Armed conflict is one of the leading causes of human misery and destruction in 
the world. Conflict claims the lives of combatants and civilians alike, often in greater 
tolls for the latter category than the first. It leads to massive population displacements, 
social break-down, capital flight, ecological damage, and loss of livelihood. During 
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armed conflicts, public infrastructures like bridges, hospitals, and schools are often 
targeted by militants. This greatly undermines a government’s capacity to provide basic 
services to its citizens. Moreover, scarce resources are diverted from productive 
activities to violence. According to Barash and Webel (2004), “there can be no question 
that on balance, war is impoverishing. It is essentially a parasite, feeding off the 
economic and social strength of societies, and like most parasites, it weakens the host” 
(p.492). 
 The Horn of Africa is gravely affected by protracted armed conflicts that are 
interconnected at the local, national, and international levels. Conflict and insecurity 
severely constrain development efforts by destroying physical infrastructures, disrupting 
trade and markets, and diverting human and financial resources away from productive 
sectors. Conflict also imposes huge economic and social costs through human 
displacement, violation of basic human rights, and the destruction of livelihoods. These 
costs disproportionately affect poor and marginalized groups, including women and 
children (Eteffa, 2005). 
 According to the Ogaden Relief and Development Organization [ORDO], one of 
the impacts of the long civil war in Region 5 has been the extreme shortage of basic 
social services. The implications of inadequate access to social services have in turn 
strained the human capital development and the productive capacity of the region. 
Region 5 has 1.3 million children without primary and intermediate schooling and 
another 1.3 million adults without access to any form of adult education (ORDO, 2010). 
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 Conflict is commonly cited as an important cause of poverty. The effects of 
conflict are often immediate and dramatic. On the other hand, the consequences also 
accrue long after the fighting has stopped, usually as war over-hang effects. Depending 
on the magnitude and duration of conflict, the impacts also manifest at a variety of levels 
including national (macro-level), local (meso-level), and household (micro-level). 
(United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2005). 
The damaging impact of any armed conflict depends on its size (the area and the 
population it covers), stage, duration, and strategies adopted during the course of the 
fight. The negative outcomes of some organized conflicts can extend beyond the local 
setting and cover a wider area. Large scale interstate and intrastate conflicts are known 
to have significant socioeconomic impact that can be felt at the national level       
(Green, 1994).  
 The most obvious way in which a civil war damages an economy is through the 
destruction of human and physical resources. Another consequence of conflict is the 
disruption of the regular social and economic activities in the conflict setting. Social 
order and the rule of the law are often suspended during armed conflicts. The destruction 
wrought by warfare and the erosion of institutions and organizations constitute 
deterioration in the economic environment. Conflict also entails the diversion of 
government spending from development enhancing activities to military buildup. 
Moreover, the insecurity caused by armed conflict discourages domestic investments 
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and push human, physical, and financial capitals outside of the conflict setting    
(Collier, 1999). 
The World Human Security Center points out that as of the beginning of the 
1990s, the number and intensity of organized conflicts have decreased worldwide. 
However, this is counter to the experience of Sub-Saharan Africa where most of the 
world’s armed conflicts currently take place. At the turn of the twenty-first century, 
more people were killed in wars in this region than in the rest of the world combined. It 
has been suggested that armed conflict in the region is now the single most important 
determinant of poverty (Schindler & Bruck, 2007). 
 Africa has been one of the fertile grounds for armed conflicts during the second 
half of the twentieth century. These conflicts have been a major cause of human 
suffering and underdevelopment in the continent. According to Copson (1994), 
“measured in terms of death, refugees and displaced persons, and lost economic 
opportunities, African war is one of the great calamities of our era” (p.97). The extent of 
disaster caused by conflict may never be fully grasped, both for technical and emotional 
reasons. In addition to its human impact, armed conflict has been responsible for 
massive disruption of societies, their networks, and their institutions. Africa’s wars have 
also caused serious economic consequences for the countries involved. The day to day 
cost of running a war have in many instances crippled national economies, stalled 
development projects, and deterred potential investments in conflict-afflicted countries. 
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Armed conflict is also behind most of the famines that occurred in the continent during 
the last five decades (Copson, 1994). 
 A research made by OXFAM and the International Action Network on Small 
Arms [IANSA] (2007) points out that compared to peaceful nations, African countries in 
conflict have, on average, 50 percent more infant deaths, 15 percent more 
undernourished population, 20 percent more adult illiteracy, 2.5 times fewer doctors per 
patient, and life expectancy reduced by five years. 
The consequences of armed conflicts on the social and economic development of 
nations have been well documented. In the last two decades, there has been a growing 
body of empirical research focusing on the impacts of violent conflicts on poverty. 
While these studies examine the effect of conflict on poverty from many angles, the 
majority are macro-level economic analysis of conflict. According to Ibanez (2010), a 
large strand of economic literature estimate the impact of civil conflict on economic 
growth and social outcomes based on aggregate economic data. However, such data fall 
short of identifying the mechanism and channels through which conflict impacts 
economic activities and social conditions leading to poverty. Moreover, it is important to 
go beyond aggregate data in designing policies that aim to mitigate the effects of conflict 
and promote sustainable peace (Ibanez, 2010). 
 Although most researches on conflict are macro-level studies, there is a growing 
awareness on the importance of a micro-level analysis. According to Schindler and 
Bruck (2007), some studies have started to include the impact of conflict at the 
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household level instead of solely relying on national level data. These studies employ 
the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) to measure the impacts of conflict on the 
human, physical financial, natural, and social capitals at multiple levels including, 
national, local, and household levels. 
 One of the characteristic features of armed conflict is that it destroys the social 
and economic foundations of individuals and households. The results can temporarily or 
permanently halt the ability of households to maintain a sustainable livelihood and meet 
their basic needs. According to the SLA framework, people’s capacity to generate and 
maintain their means of living depends on drawing on a range of core assets called 
capitals. These assets serve as the building blocks of people’s livelihoods. There are five 
types of assets that all together enable people to pursue sustainable livelihoods. These 
are human, physical, economic, social, and natural capitals. The extent of access to these 
capitals is strongly influenced by the amount of control, or lack thereof, that people have 
over their surroundings. Armed conflict represents one of the factors that hamper the full 
utilization of livelihood capitals and push people into poverty (Kollmair & Gamper, 
2002). 
At the grassroots level, human capital refers to the knowledge, skills, and 
capabilities possessed by members of a household for pursuing their livelihood 
activities. Conflict destroys the human capital of a household directly and indirectly. 
According to Orero, Heime, Cuttler, and Mohaupt (2007), conflict can impact on the 
human capital of households by causing death, forced migration, physical and mental 
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disabilities, declines in health and nutrition status, and reducing education opportunities. 
These factors constrain the short-term and the long-term capacities of households to earn 
income and can drive them into poverty. In addition to this, conflict weakens the 
financial capital of households by disrupting production activities, diminishing credits 
and savings, and causing market failures. Moreover, conflict wipes out the physical 
capital of households by destroying assets and production inputs. During armed 
conflicts, a large number of physical assets are destroyed, seized, or abandoned. The loss 
of such capital limits the productivity of households and signals a significant loss of 
welfare. In addition to these effects, conflict entails a breakdown in natural resource 
management and customary rights which results in the mismanagement and depletion of 
natural capital in conflict affected areas. The other consequence of conflict is the effect 
on social capital through disrupting family networks and relationships of trust and 
cutting off access to wider institutions of society (Orero, et.al, 2007). 
  The processes of violence impact the economic status of households through the 
direct and indirect human, physical, social, political, and cultural transformations they 
entail. Some of the direct effects of conflict include changes in household composition 
and income due to death, physical and psychological injuries, and conscription into the 
military. Another direct effect of conflict includes changes in the household economic 
status due to the destruction of assets and livelihoods and the effects caused by forced 
displacement and migration. The indirect effects of conflict are reflected at the local 
level or at the national level. Local indirect effects include changes in households’ 
access to local resources, employment, credit and insurance markets, social relations and 
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networks, and other institutions. At the national level, the indirect effects of conflict 
consist of a decline in economic growth which can impact household welfare      
(Justino, 2008).  
The Closing Gap between Peace and Development 
 The essence of studying the bidirectional relationship between poverty and 
conflict suggests the need for a comprehensive approach that addresses the two 
variables. According to Hillyard et al. (2005), the outcome of studying the two 
dimensions of the poverty-conflict relationship is helpful in devising policies and actions 
that simultaneously reduce poverty and promote peace. This means integrating 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution with anti-poverty strategies and those international 
programs ostensibly concerned with reconstruction. This represents a new interface of 
research and practice in the fields of poverty and conflict (Hillyard et al. 2008). 
 The Horn of Africa has long suffered from the effects of widespread poverty and 
protracted conflicts. There are multiple causes of conflict in the region one of which is 
the unfair distribution of resources which results in the social and economic exclusion of 
certain groups of society. This often entails in disparities through the lack of 
infrastructure, social services, and security between different regions of a country. 
Equitable development plays a positive role in conflict prevention by addressing the 
long-term structural causes of conflict, such as poverty, injustice, and poor governance. 
At the same time, peace and security are fundamental to poverty reduction and 
sustainable development in the Horn of Africa. Given the prevalence and the high risk of 
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poverty and conflict in the region and the clear link between the two, it requires a 
holistic approach that simultaneously addresses both problems (Eteffa, 2005).  
 At the turn of this century, world leaders of the North and South met at the 2000 
UN Millennium Summit and made a commitment to meet the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). One of the ambitious goals set at the time was to reduce poverty and 
human deprivation by half in the year 2015. According to Penh (2009), despite the 
progress made by China and India in the past decade, poverty has remained a significant 
challenge in conflict-affected countries where nearly one-third of the world poor lives. 
The virtual challenge of the poverty-conflict cycle has stimulated a new discussion and 
partnership among the poverty reduction and conflict resolution communities. While 
significant intellectual and practical contributions have been made in the fields of 
poverty and conflict over decades, knowledge and practice in the convergence of these 
two fields is still new and evolving (Penh, 2009). 
 The recognition of the mutual relationship between poverty and conflict has also 
brought the realization of the causal interrelatedness between peace and development. 
Although conflicts tend to reverse development, in many ways, the lack of socio-
economic development itself constitutes a powerful source of grievance which under 
some circumstances can precipitate violent conflict. It is from this point that various 
international and multilateral agencies have started to address peace and development in 
a more holistic and integrated manner. For instance the Security Council, one of the 
principal organs of the United Nations responsible for maintaining international peace 
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and security, has progressively been integrating development with peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding. It has extended its focus by addressing the immediate reconstruction 
needs and the long term development and resolution of the structural causes of conflict. 
In addition to this, other UN bodies that traditionally focus on socio-economic 
development such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) are increasingly getting involved in 
crisis prevention and conflict resolution thus integrating, peace and development issues 
into their missions (Ocampo, 2004).  
 With the increasing knowledge on the two-way relationship between poverty and 
conflict, the debates on peacebuilding and development are also moving closer together. 
There is now a greater understanding of the shared objectives of sustainable 
development and sustainable peace. In conflict prevention, the balance has shifted from 
exclusive military response to more structural approaches that focus on the long-term 
aspect of preventing a civil war. In development cooperation, increased attention is 
being paid to the political conditions for development and the need to focus on the 
causes rather than the appearances of poverty. Conflict resolution is also becoming an 
integral part of the quest to reduce poverty and attain sustainable development. 
Moreover, development agencies are recognizing the need to work in and on conflicts 
rather than around them. More focus is being directed towards peacebuilding, which 
reflects a step toward a long-term engagement and away from an earlier short-term 
concentration on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction efforts (Verstegen, 2001).  
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 Lederach (1997) also highlights a similar argument by underscoring the 
importance of the link between peace and development. For Lederach, both peace and 
development endeavors must be connected to a longterm goal that sustainably transform 
a given population from a condition of extreme vulnerability and dependency to one of 
self-sufficiency and well-being. They should lead to a proactive process that is capable 
of regenerating a "spiral of peace and development instead of a spiral of violence and 
destruction" (p.75). 
Summary 
In recent years, the poverty-conflict nexus has often played out along the greed-
grievance debate, which presents two models to explain violence under conditions of 
poverty. Popular among political economists, the greed model was developed based on 
the influential work of Collier and Hoeffler (2001). It argues that civil war ignites as a 
result of the predatory aspirations of rebels who want to grasp wealth through the 
extortion and looting of primary commodities like oil and diamonds. Furthermore, the 
lack of economic opportunities under poverty makes the cost of joining rebel groups 
lower for the poor. On the other side of the debate, social psychologists have developed 
their hypothesis, the grievance model. It is mostly based on the work of Gurr (1970) 
who employs the notion of “relative deprivation” as the micro-foundation of collective 
violence. When members of a collective group perceive deprivation in comparison to 
another group or when there is a disparity between their aspirations and capabilities, it 
can lead to frustration and aggression. 
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The causal interaction between poverty and conflict is bi-directional. The 
impoverishment of any social group creates a ripe condition for conflict and the 
destructive and depressing impacts of conflict are factors that in turn perpetuate poverty 
The connection is two-way, but it is not a linear relationship where one is the automatic 
result of the other. The significance of studying the two-way linkage between poverty 
and conflict lies in strengthening the partnership between peace and development; doing 
so helps to converge the communities of conflict resolution and development for a 
common purpose.    
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6. Analysis 
From Poverty to Conflict: Region 5  
 A 2008 baseline study of violent conflicts in Ethiopia identifies the main causes of 
domestic conflicts as controversies over ethnic identity and religion, disagreements over 
border and administrative arrangements, population dynamics, mineral extraction 
activities, and discriminatory caste-like culture. In spite of its contribution in pointing 
out the important elements of conflict in Ethiopia, the study failed to recognize poverty 
as a major factor in any of Ethiopia’s domestic conflicts (African Rally for Peace and 
Development [ARPD], 2008). 
The above conclusion is common among many studies of intrastate conflicts in 
Ethiopia. Assefa (1996) asserts that most of the wars waged in the Horn of Africa during 
the past six decades have been described in terms of ethnic conflict, both by the 
adversaries themselves and by external analysts. The majority of modern day conflicts in 
Ethiopia have been presented as inter-ethnic rivalry for cultural autonomy and self-rule. 
The reason for this, according to Stewart (2009), is that most conflicts are classified 
based on their organizing identity, irrespective of the true underlying motive (p.5). 
Therefore, we often focus on the basis of how people are mobilized instead of the socio-
economic and political causes of such mobilization. This is also true of Region 5 where 
past and present organized conflicts are simply portrayed as ethnic strife between the 
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“Amhara” or “Tigre” 16 ethnic dominated central governments of Ethiopia and ethnic 
Somalis in Region 5. 
 On the contrary, the identification of Region 5 inhabitants as ethnic Somalis or as 
members of the majority Ogadeen clan does not automatically translate into collective 
violence. As Gross Stein (1996) argues, social identity and differentiation do not 
inevitably lead to conflict. If they did, conflict would occur at all times under all 
conditions. Boix & Stokes (2007) also argue, “this is not to deny that ethnicity plays a 
part in conflict, but that it is insufficient to look at the presence of groups (ethnic, 
religious, sectarian, etc.) to explain the onset of conflict” (p.420). For Boix and Stokes, 
the salience of ethnic identities itself may be the outcome of a conflict rather than its 
cause.  
The single focus on ethnicity as the underlying source of armed conflicts has 
often ignored the role of poverty in triggering and sustaining conflicts in Region 5. This 
has led to poverty being treated as a side issue with no significant link to violence. As 
will be seen in the next sections, poverty plays a crucial role in igniting and maintaining 
the civil war in Region 5.  
 
                                                 
16
 The Amhara and Tigre are the major ethnic groups accounting for 30.1 percent and 
6.2 percent of the national population respectively (CIA, 2010). In many discourses, the 
Amharas are believed to have dominated the political scene of the country since the 
middle ages, until replaced by the Tigres in 1991. Rebel groups like the ONLF (2009) 
argue that “past Amhara and present Tigre” domination is one of the leading causes of 
long-term instability in the country. Such views have been contested by scholars like 
Assefa (1996) who questions if “Amhara domination” is a code word that disguises 
other social grievances or if it signifies supremacy of one population over another. 
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Greed or Grievance? 
 In recent years, the poverty-conflict nexus has often played out along the greed-
grievance debate, which presents two models to explain violence under conditions of 
poverty. According to these two theories, the impetus to rebel can be related to either 
economic or socio-political factors. What can we label the civil war in Region 5? Is it 
greed based or a grievance driven conflict? This question can be answered by analyzing 
the region’s socio-economic profile and identifying the conflict-motivating factors for 
rebel leaders and their followers. 
According to Dzurilla (2010), the greed driven theory of civil war argues that 
poverty and the lack of economic opportunities drive insurgencies into action. Rebels 
use a cost-benefit analysis to determine if the economic incentives of waging war 
outweigh its relative costs. Moreover, an economy highly dependent on exporting 
primary products such as diamonds or oil is at a greater risk of civil war. This is because 
such commodities are easily looted by insurgencies for buying weapons and ammunition 
and paying off their fighters. Region 5 does not extract or export non-renewable 
resources like oil or diamonds. According to Devreux (2006), a crucial part of the 
region’s economy relies on pastoralism, which mainly involves exporting livestock to 
neighboring countries. It is true that in recent times the region has attracted foreign oil 
companies from China, Sweden, Canada, United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia, which 
have signed exploration deals with the Ethiopian government. According to Salopek 
(2007) of the Chicago Tribune, the real prize is not the potential crude oil but the 
 Poverty and Conflict                                                                                                      65 
 
 
estimated 4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the region. Although there is a huge 
potential of future production, there has not been any real extraction of oil or natural gas 
in the region. 
The ONLF has on numerous occasions warned foreign companies to halt their 
operations in Region 5.
17
 Despite its strong opposition to oil exploration activities in the 
region, the ONLF does not draw its support through the prospect of looting natural 
resources or demanding royalties from the oil companies. Its fighters are neither paid 
soldiers nor are recruited on the promise of any material or monetary compensations. 
The operational finance of the group is also not associated with the extraction and 
extortion of natural resources.
 18
 The region is endowed with untapped resources of 
natural gas and oil, but it is unrealistic to say that the motive behind the civil war is 
about making profit from an undeveloped resource. Nevertheless, the presence of oil 
companies can certainly complicate the dynamic of the conflict in the region. 
 
                                                 
17
 The ONLF accuses these oil companies for collaborating with the Ethiopian 
government and wants to discourage their investment in the region. In April, 2007, the 
ONLF raided a Chinese run oil exploration project that left 74 people dead including 9 
Chinese workers (ibid). 
18
  According to HRW (2008), the ONLF is a grassroots social and political movement 
that consists of a rural-based guerrilla force. Its fighters regularly interact with civilians 
and obtain food and water from a network of civilian supporters in the towns and 
villages. Despite the attempts by the Ethiopian government to label the ONLF as a 
terrorist group, the U.S and the European Union (EU) didn’t enlist the ONLF as terrorist 
organization by the end of 2010. 
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Therefore the basic idea that greed is the main factor in the region’s civil war is 
simply misleading. Below are some of the factors that support this argument: 
1. The economy of the region relies on the export of livestock to neighboring 
countries. The region doesn’t produce or export non-renewable natural resources 
that serve as a potential loot for rebel insurgencies. Proponents of the greed 
theory focus on the economic dimension of armed conflicts and argue that rebels 
finance their operation through the exploitation of natural resources. On the 
contrary, the ONLF is not involved in resource capture as part of funding or 
running its operation. The civil war in the region can’t be categorized as a 
resource war. 
2. The ONLF doesn’t have a commercial agenda in its fight against the 
government. 
3.  The ONLF doesn’t promise its fighters financial or material incentives upon    
enlisting. 
4.  One of the characteristics of greed-based civil wars is the emergence of war 
economies, which is made possible by the climate of impunity and lawlessness 
that civil war helps to create. In this type of economies, civilians participate in 
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unregulated activities such as mining, smuggling, or growing illicit crops. This is 
not the characteristic of the civil war in Region 5.
19
 
5.  The greed theory contends that the lack of economic opportunities in poverty-
stricken societies makes the opportunity cost of joining rebels low. Hence the 
decision to enlist in a rebel group is based on a simple rational choice that 
measures the economic cost and benefit of violence. Compared to a civilian life, 
an ONLF fighter often experiences a very hard life in an inhospitable 
environment with minimal access to the basic necessities of life. Even by 
Rational Choice Theory (RCT), which is the corner stone of the greed rebellion 
theory, it is difficult to suggest that the personal benefits associated with joining 
the rebel group outweigh the relative costs of a civilian life. 
 The Role of Collective Grievance in the Civil War  
Both the greed and grievance theories concur that poverty is an important 
predisposing condition for violence, but they still differ in their approach on the actual 
conflict driving factors. Although the greed model can be employed in several contexts, 
its applicability to the civil war in Region 5 remains very limited. On the other hand, the 
grievance theory offers a more practical approach to the context of Region 5. The 
grievance model posits that many of today’s conflicts emanate from and are fought out 
in frontier regions that have historically suffered from marginalization, limited voice, 
                                                 
19
 The cross-border import and export trade between Region 5 and neighboring Somalia 
is largely considered as a contraband transaction by the government. On the contrary, 
this trade predates the current conflict and is not the direct result of the civil war.  
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and hard-core poverty (Goodhand, 2001). The relative deprivation of social groups 
produce collective grievance that can be exploited by politicians and rebel groups to 
generate conflicts. 
 According to the grievance theory, the underlying circumstances or the 
socioeconomic and political conditions that negatively differentiate ethnic Somalis as a 
cultural or regional unit from other similar groups form an important tangent of the five 
decades civil conflict in Region 5. Here, the socio-economic and political 
marginalization of the people is framed through their cultural identity. In simple terms, 
the coupling of the Somali cultural identity and the relative deprivation perceived by 
members of this same cultural group explains the root source of the violent civil conflict 
in the region. Lunn (2008) supports this argument by stating that one of the factors that 
exacerbate the likelihood of armed conflict in the region is the relative deprivation of its 
people in terms of access to social, economic, and political resources. 
Historical Deprivation of Ethnic-Somalis in Modern Ethiopia 
 For the greater part of its modern history, Region 5 has been one of the most 
deprived and insecure regions of Ethiopia. Armed conflict and poverty are constant 
sources of vulnerability for the people of the region. Living in one of the most fragile 
ecosystems of the world, pastoralists of the region are not only exposed to various 
natural and man-made disasters, but they also possess limited capacity to cope with the 
damaging losses (Markakis, 2004).The introduction of a modern state system, brought 
through colonialism and the Ethiopian state expansion at the end of the nineteenth 
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century, introduced catastrophic challenges to Somali pastoralists. The restriction on 
movement, trade regulation, and territorial demarcation imposed by the modern state 
administrations impaired the indigenous survival mechanisms of pastoralists and further 
pushing them into poverty. By the mid- twentieth century, Lockyer (2006) argues that 
there was no sign of development in the region. It was a flat and dry pastoral land that 
had remained virtually void of any form of economic, infrastructural, or social 
development. 
 Setting Region 5 in the national context shows that it is one of the most 
impoverished regional states of Ethiopia. A study by Deressa et al (2008), concluded 
that the region is at the lowest level of regional development in Ethiopia. The study also 
revealed that the region had the lowest proportion of healthcare services, food markets, 
primary and secondary schools, and access to modern farm supplies. Although livestock 
ownership is the highest in the country, it is met with the lowest provision of veterinary 
services nationwide.  
 The Central Emergency Response Fund [CERF] (2010) identifies Region 5 as 
one of the least developed regions of Ethiopia in terms of access to essential services 
and food security. The area is also comparatively prone to outbreaks of measles, 
meningitis, and viral hemorrhagic fevers due to lack of health care services. Malnutrition 
accounts for eight percent of all mortalities while deaths during childbirths constitute 
twenty-three percent of all mortalities in the region. 
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 One of the striking features of Region 5 is the extreme lack of social services 
available to its people. These services are often under-resourced and unevenly 
distributed. Where there are schools and health clinics, there are often no teachers, 
books, doctors, or medical supplies. This stands against the rising expectations of how 
people can live and what they are entitled to receive from the region. The presence of 
unfulfilled needs means a gap between social expectations and reality that leads to social 
frustration and increases the possibility of armed conflict (CHF, 2006). 
 Many studies support the notion that Region 5 is a relatively underdeveloped part 
of Ethiopia. A report on the distribution of manufacturing industries by regional states 
points out that Region 5 accounts for only 0.52 percent of the total number of large and 
medium scale industries in the country. This number can be compared with Region 1 
and Region 3 which comprise of 12.5 and 8.7 percents respectively, for the same 
category of manufacturing industries (CSA, 2009). Regional inequalities are not only 
limited to the manufacturing sector. The 2004 Welfare Monitoring Survey of Ethiopia 
marked Region 5 for its lowest level of primary school enrollment (38 percent) in the 
country. A stark disparity is also noted in immunization coverage for DPT,
20
 BCG,
21
 and 
Measles which stands at 17 percent for Region 5. This can be compared with 87 percent 
for Region 1 and 74 percent for the national average.
22
 Access to information which is 
                                                 
20
 Diptheria, Pertussis and Tetanus Vaccine 
21
 Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (Tuberculosis) 
22
 The data refers to children under the age of 5. 
 Poverty and Conflict                                                                                                      71 
 
 
measured by household ownership of radio sets
23
 once again finds its lowest proportion 
in Region 5. Only 48.3 percent of households in the region own radio sets. The 
percentage shows significant increase for other regional states of Ethiopia (69.2 percent 
for Region 4 and 85 percent for Region 14) (CSA, 2004).  
 All the above indicators point to the unfair share of material and non-material 
resources between Region 5 and other regions of Ethiopia. It is one of the main reasons 
that have placed the region in a chronic state of poverty. It is also a major source of 
social grievance in the region that has mobilized citizens to rebel against the 
government. The complexity of such inequalities arises from the fact that regional states 
in Ethiopia are also ethnically carved territories. Therefore, the socio-economic 
inequality between regions also represents inequality along identity lines. Brown (2005) 
argues that the broad coincidence of cultural or ethnic differences with severe economic, 
political, or social inequalities can be a significant cause of violent conflicts. Such 
inequalities, also termed as horizontal inequalities, are potent sources of armed conflict 
in Region 5. 
 From a historic perspective, Region 5 has been one Ethiopian frontier where the 
introduction of modern statehood has minimally impacted service delivery and 
institutional capacity (Hagmann & Kahlif, 2006). The state of socioeconomic welfare of 
the region has been low not only in the absolute sense but also relative to the national 
average. Ostby (2006) underlines that those societies with high regional inequalities 
                                                 
23
 Radio is the major source of information for the majority of the population in 
Ethiopia. 
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carry a higher risk of civil war than societies without such inequalities. Ostby adds that 
members of the disadvantaged group or region are likely to feel frustration and 
antagonism especially when their deprivation is the result of structural exploitation and 
discrimination. The national imbalance or the inter-regional inequality in socio-
economic welfare between Region 5 and other parts of Ethiopia is the major source of 
social frustration and conflict in the region. As Lederach (1997) posited, what is often 
understood as “content” or “substance” of a conflict is this structural dimension  which 
highlights the underlying causes of conflict (p.83). 
 Region 5 fares worse than most other regions of Ethiopia across multiple socio-
economic indicators (see table 2). It has remained a periphery state throughout most of 
its modern history, causing frustration and ill-will of its people towards the government 
(Hagmann, 2007). According to Nicol, Arsano, & Raisin (2000), the legacy of tension 
between the central state and the periphery coupled with state authority over the control 
of resources meant that the state often became the focus of conflict. This was especially 
true where resource allocation was perceived to be relatively uneven. However, the shift 
from grievances of deprivation and inequality to collective violence did not occur 
without the role played by rebel movements and other political actors. 
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Table 2 
Poverty Indicators: Region 5 Versus the National Average (2005) 
Poverty Indicator Region 
5 
National 
Average 
 
Percentage of population with no formal education 
Male 
 
                                                                                               
Female                                                                                                           
 
 
82 
 
89 
 
 
        52 
 
        67 
Percentage of women with access to antenatal care 7.4      46.3 
Percentage of women who were protected against neonatal 
Tetanus through Tetanus toxoid injection  
 
9.1 
 
     38.9 
Percentage of population with healthcare facility located more 
than a mile away 
82.7      53.3 
Percentage of children age 12-23 months who received  BCG, 
DPT , Polio and Measles vaccines 
8.1      67.2 
Percentage of children under 5 years classified as malnourished 
according to anthropometric indices ( height for age, weigh for 
height and age) 
30.3      17.8 
Percentage of population aged 15-49 with comprehensive 
knowledge about HIV-AIDS 
50      93.3 
Prevalence of Anemia in children aged 6-59 months 85.6      50.4 
Note: Ethiopia, Demographic and Health Survey: 2005 by CSA. Copyright 2006 by 
Central Statistics Agency. Public Data. 
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The Role of Rebel Groups in Mobilizing for Organized Conflict 
During the past five decades, organized conflicts in Region 5 have played out as 
an interconnected web of interstate and intrastate conflicts involving both state and non-
state actors. Armed rebel groups like the OLF, WSLF, and ONLF have carried out their 
missions as grassroots movements by recruiting from the historically marginalized 
population of Region 5. Although the support from the neighboring state of Somalia was 
significant during the high time of the Cold War, Africa Watch Report [AWR] (1991) 
argues that it was the frustrated and alienated people of Region 5 who formed the major 
fighting force of armed opposition movements. These groups have effectively rallied the 
region’s population against successive Ethiopian governments in response to the 
prevailing and anticipated horizontal inequalities. They have harnessed the social 
frustration resulting from these inequalities to mobilize mass support around their cause. 
As stated in the previous paragraphs, Region 5 is one of the most underserved 
regions of Ethiopia. The various socio-economic data (CSA, 2004, 2009) testify the 
impoverishment and the relative deprivation of the region. The social frustration and 
resentment that generates from these conditions have helped the ONLF and other rebel 
groups to initiate grassroots insurgencies at various times. Holzer (2010) argues that the 
ONLF has been able to build on the local grievances of four million ethnic Somalis in 
Ethiopia’s most underdeveloped territory. In the same manner, Mohamoud (2009) points 
out that the economic misery and the lack of basic government services are some of the 
systemic problems that give the ONLF its needed recruits. Mohamoud also confirms that 
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there is a genuine anger and feeling of hopelessness among the region’s citizens 
concerning their economic well-being. 
According to Stewart and Brown (2007), rebel groups need genuine social, 
economic, or political grievances for mass mobilization. In addition to this, a common 
history, language, culture, or religion is generally required to generate felt identities 
powerful enough to mobilize people for conflict. The Somali cultural identity has 
inevitably provided the foundation for mobilizing its members for political action. It has 
equipped rebel groups with the basis for gathering mass support. Menzel (2006) points 
out that the feeling of deprivation can be harnessed and directed towards the 
strengthening of the group identity and used to manifest resistance and change. During 
the last fifty years, rebel groups in Region 5 have created a structural linkage between 
poverty of the region and the social identity of its people. In simple words, rebel groups 
have framed the poverty and exclusion of the region through the cultural (ethnic) 
identity of its people. This has helped in mobilizing civilians for collective violence. 
Armed dissident movements have also successfully politicized the Somali ethnic 
identity by revising its shared history and creating a new form of group consciousness. 
One of the ways this was carried out was by trying to build a historic continuity of the 
Somali and Ethiopian hostility dating back to the sixteenth century religious 
wars between the Adal Sultanate
24
 and the Ethiopian Christian Empire (Hagmann, 
                                                 
24
 The Adal Sultanate was a medieval multi-ethnic Muslim kingdom located in the Horn 
of Africa. It included part of what is today Region 5, Region 2 (Afar), Somaliland, and 
Djibouti. 
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2007). Rebels have frequently activated shared historical memories of victimization and 
humiliation for the collective group. Volkan (1998) identifies such collective memories 
as “chosen trauma.” It is an effective way of bringing a social group together for 
common action including violence. While these efforts have brought the social cohesion 
needed for political mobilization, they have also transformed the Somali cultural identity 
into a political identity.  
Summary 
For the greater part of its modern history, Region 5 has been one of the poorest 
and the most marginalized regions of Ethiopia. The socio-economic development in the 
region reflects a stark difference when compared to other regions of Ethiopia. The 
relative impoverishment of the region is a strong source of grievance among its people. 
Here, the inhabitants perceive the region’s deprivation at the level of their collective 
identity. Politicians and rebel groups have been able to capitalize this shared sense of 
grievance to mobilize people for violence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Poverty and Conflict                                                                                                      77 
 
 
From Conflict to Poverty: Region 5 
 One of the concepts that study the impact of conflict on poverty is the 
Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA). According to this framework, a livelihood is 
sustainable if it can maintain its capabilities and assets (human, economic, physical, 
natural, and social capitals) for now and future generations to come. What people can do 
and how this results in a sustainable outcome like food security can be subjected to 
various external influences, one of which is armed conflict. Conflict can deplete and 
distort the human, physical, economic, social, and natural capitals of a nation at multiple 
layers, including the household, local, and national levels (FAO, 2010). 
Conflict impacts on poverty through a range of direct and indirect factors. Some 
of the direct costs of conflict include the toll on human lives, the physical injury and 
psychological trauma incurred on survivors, the mass displacement of civilians, and the 
destruction of productive assets and physical infrastructures. The indirect consequences 
of conflict refer to the effects on the survival and welfare of people due to collapsing 
health care systems, low school enrollments, food insecurity, social disorder, and 
diversion of resources from development programs to violence. The combined direct and 
indirect repercussions of conflict can destroy and reduce the human, physical, economic, 
social, and natural capitals of a nation at various levels. 
Region 5 is one of the most conflict ridden and poverty stricken provinces of 
Ethiopia. Decades of war and violent conflict has diminished the region’s human, 
physical, economic, social, and natural capitals and impoverished its inhabitants. The 
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region has been devoid of meaningful socio-economic development for the entire part of 
its modern history. It remains an underserved region with the lowest level of human 
development in the country. The region’s literacy rate of 22 percent for males and only 
9.8 percent among females is an indicator of its low level of human development (CSA, 
2006). Derressa et al (2008) also point out that Region 5 has the lowest literacy rate, the 
least access to health care services, and the lowest life expectancy nationwide. For years, 
the persistence of hunger and malnutrition has affected millions in the region. In the last 
decade alone, a million people a year (25 percent of the total population) were food aid 
beneficiaries (ibid).  
 According to a United Nation’s [UN] (2007) report, the poor development of 
Region 5 must be seen against the backdrop of the long-standing civil war between the 
Ethiopian government and rebels in the region. On the other hand, it is worth noting that 
the poverty in the region cannot be tied to a single conflict episode but to the sum impact 
of the various conflicts that have occurred over the centuries. Accounting for each 
conflict of the past is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that most of the violent conflicts fought in the region possessed two 
important features that have contributed to the poverty in the region. These are: 
1.  Armed conflicts in the region have often deliberately targeted the socio-
economic base of households. The destruction of human, physical, economic, social, 
and natural capitals, which are essential for the survival of households, has created 
widespread poverty in the region. 
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2.  Pastoralists in Region 5 inhabit one of the most barren ecosystems in the Horn of 
 Africa. For centuries, pastoralists have employed effective and efficient coping 
 strategies that have sustained them in such an environment. Violent conflicts 
 often block the implementation of these adaptive strategies and reduce the 
 effective utilization of livelihood capitals, which in turn leads to poverty. 
The Effects of Armed Conflicts in Region 5 (1960-2010) 
In the last five decades, several armed conflicts have taken place in Region 5 in 
the form of interstate wars and intrastate conflicts. These conflicts have played 
prominent role in undermining household capitals and pushing them into poverty. As 
will be seen in the next section, the military strategies adopted by successive Ethiopian 
regimes (1960-2010) were also crucial in impoverishing the region. The following are 
some of the effects that armed conflicts have had on the region. 
The Human Cost of Conflict 
Given the great number of conflicts that took place in the region, there is no 
exact figure on the human costs of conflict. On the other hand, it is safe to say that 
violence has persistently preyed upon the human capital of the region by killing, 
disabling, assaulting, and displacing civilians. Conflict has also impeded the 
development of human capital by disrupting the education, health, and food distribution 
systems of the region.  
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Death and Physical and Psychological Injuries 
In Region 5, the human casualty of armed conflicts has not been limited to 
combatants. Civilians have often been victims of indiscriminate killings during 
insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. However, civilian causality is not only the 
outcome of direct violence. According to Zwi & Macrae (1994), civilians are threatened 
not only by bombs and bullets but by the massive social and economic dislocation 
caused by war. The breakdown or the absence of health and social services in the region, 
which is partly caused by conflict, also claims many lives. Devreux (2006) states that the 
poor quality and limited accessibility to health services in the region is demonstrated by 
the high numbers of preventable deaths due to untreated illness, inadequate 
immunization coverage, malnutrition and hunger-related diseases, and deaths of mothers 
and infants during childbirth. In addition to the loss of lives, armed conflict in the region 
has resulted in mental and physical disablement of civilians.
25
 
Mass Displacement of Civilians 
One of the defining features of organized conflicts in the region is the 
involuntary displacement of civilians within and across borders that create internally 
displaced persons (IDP) and refugees. When people are uprooted from their habitual 
residence, they leave behind the livelihood capitals they have accumulated over time. 
                                                 
25
 According to Marshall (2006), far more problematic than conflict-related deaths is the 
much larger numbers of survivors who are physically and psychologically affected by 
violence.  
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According to Cernea (2004), forced displacement can cause impoverishment among the 
displaced by bringing about landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, 
food insecurity, increased morbidity, and community breakdown. In addition to these, 
migration disrupts education, health care, and other social services. 
 In the last few decades, thousands of civilians in Region 5 have fled their homes 
in fear of violence and persecution. According to Tareke (2002), successive Ethiopian 
governments have forcefully and purposefully uprooted rural inhabitants to isolate 
insurgents (WSLF and ONLF) and deprive them of their local support. To this effect, the 
forceful relocation of civilians has been used as a military strategy during the decades 
old civil war. A case in point is the counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the Ethiopian 
government in 1979 in an attempt to eradicate the WSLF. One aspect of this strategy 
was to depopulate the conflict zone. This resulted in half a million people crossing into 
neighboring Somalia as refugees while hundreds of thousands were displaced internally 
(AWR, 1991). According to Mohamoud Abdi (2007), eighty percent of the region’s 
population was in one way or another affected by this displacement. A similar 
counterinsurgency method was employed by the successor Ethiopian government in 
2007. This time, the operation aimed at weakening ONLF’s (breakaway rebel group 
from WSLF) support base and confining its area of operation. The government 
depopulated small villages and pastoralist settlements in conflict zones by ordering 
villagers and nomads to move to designated towns. Many of the villages and settlements 
were later burned to prevent reentry by the local inhabitant (HRW, 2008a)                 
(See Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Satellite Images of the Village of Lassoole, Region 5 Before and After 
     Burning  
Note: Ogaden War Crimes in Ethiopia (HRW, 2008b) 
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Sexual Violence  
Sexual violence constitutes not just a byproduct of conflict but a military tactic 
implemented to instigate terror and punish civilians in conflict zones. According to 
Ogaden Human Rights Commission [OHRC] (2006), there were 1,870 reported cases of 
rape and child molestation in Region 5 between the years 1992-2005. The data is not 
reflective of the full extent of horror in the region. Most rape victims do not report such 
crimes to local authorities as they risk reprisal by the perpetrators and for fear of being 
ostracized by their own community. HRW (2008a) reported that sexual violence has 
become a widespread crime that is implemented by government forces with complete 
impunity. The rape of female detainees in military custody regularly occurs and often 
involves senior military officials, highlighting the systematic aspect of the trend.  
Sexual violence is one of the causes of poverty in conflict zones. The physical 
and psychological damages incurred on the victim account for loss of human capital. 
According to the British Medical Journal, the effects of rape and sexual torture on 
survivors are economically, physically, psychologically, and culturally devastating. 
Survivors
 
can be left with economic deprivation and sexually transmitted
 
diseases 
(Kivlahan & Ewingman, 2010). In addition to this, sexual violence perpetuates the 
feminization of poverty. Devereux (2006) points out that the effects of gender-based 
risks and vulnerabilities in the region are already visible in higher mortality rate and 
lower life expectancy of females as compared to males. When sexual violence is added 
on top of these gender based disparities, it pushes more females into poverty. 
 Poverty and Conflict                                                                                                      84 
 
 
The Killing and Confiscation of Livestock 
In Region 5, where 85.5 percent of the active population is engaged in either 
pastoralism or agro-pastoralism, livestock forms an integral part of the livelihood system 
for many households (Cooperazione Internazionale [COOPI], 2003). It represents an 
important economic capital that can either be used as a saving or can be liquidated into 
cash. Livestock is also a physical capital that produces its own output, milk, for the 
market. No less important, livestock forms a key part of the pastoralist’s cultural life and 
social support system which makes it a prime social capital. In the last five decades, this 
versatile asset of pastoralists has come under attack from successive Ethiopian regimes. 
This represents not just an assault on the economic or physical capital of pastoralists but 
also an attack on the pastoralist way of life.  
Livestock forms a vital part of pastoralist livelihood and culture and its 
decimation or expropriation can permanently impoverish its dependents. The 
confiscation of livestock is not a new phenomenon in the region. Laitin & Samatar 
(1987) point out that between 1890 and 1897, the Ethiopian Empire under King Menilik 
II consented to a number of livestock raids in the region. These raids have dispossessed 
pastoralists more than 100,000 cattle, 200,000 camels, and 600,000 sheep and goats 
(P.55). According to Markakis (2004), the confiscation of livestock was one of the 
methods applied by the Empire to secure a modicum of control over pastoralists.  
Since the beginning of the civil war in 1960, the confiscation and killing of 
livestock has taken a different form. It has become an important part of the 
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government’s military strategy to plunder and punish civilians for their assumed ties 
with insurgents.
26
 According to AWR (1991), 200,000 head of livestock was seized by 
the Ethiopian military in 1971 and 1972 alone. This method has continued in the twenty-
first century. The Integrated Regional Information Network [IRIN] (2001) reported on 
the dire economic consequences of livestock confiscation in the region. The Guardian 
(2007) also reported on how the confiscation and destruction of livestock by government 
forces contributes to humanitarian crisis in the region. 
Trade Blockade 
One of the sectors that have been disrupted with the on-going conflicts in the 
region is commercial trade. In the last five decades, trade activities in the region have 
suffered from the destructive and depressing effects of armed conflicts. This has created 
a shortfall in household income (economic capital) due to loss of employment and 
market failures. 
 Livestock is a major physical capital owned by the majority of households in 
Region 5. It is also the major source of income in the region. Most of the livestock trade 
in the region takes place in the form of informal cross-border transaction between 
pastoralists and traders. Livestock is exported to neighboring Somalia, Kenya, and 
Djibouti where it is re-exported to the Middle-East. The imports of the region, which 
                                                 
26
  Although the government is implicated in many of the civilian killings and physical 
destruction in the last five decades, rebel insurgents also played a significant role in 
destabilizing the region through indiscriminate killings, kidnappings, and planting 
landmines that destroyed human lives and infrastructures. 
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mostly include non-perishable food and consumer goods, are also imported unofficially 
from neighboring states of Somalia and Djibouti. This form of informal cross-border 
trade has been going on for centuries by using traditional trade routes that predate 
present state boundaries. These customary routes have served as the lifeline of the region 
by connecting it with different ports in Somalia and Djibouti (Devereux, 2006). 
 In the last five decades, these trade routes have been interrupted by different 
forms of conflict in the region. According to Devereux (2006), the orientation of these 
corridors is that certain clans control each route, and relations between clans along the 
route determine the smooth flow of trade. Therefore, the import-export trade in the 
region has always been susceptible to inter-clan conflicts. The other disruption to trade 
is caused by the Ethiopian government which considers the cross-border trade as illegal. 
Although the government has for a long time tried to regulate this trade, it has also 
worked to enforce it as part of its military strategy. For instance in 2007, the government 
blocked major trade routes in the region following the onset of its massive 
counterinsurgency operation. According to a report by the UN (2007), this dramatically 
reduced the flow of commercial goods and services including food into the region. 
Similarly, the export of livestock, which is the main source of income in the region, was 
significantly reduced. The results were devastating to the region. The same report 
indicated that prices of food items increased by an average of  95 percent due to shortage 
of supply while livestock prices fell by as much as 33 percent due to over-supply in the 
market. This has placed a heavy blow to the economic capital of households through 
reduced earnings and high inflation of basic commodities.  
 Poverty and Conflict                                                                                                      87 
 
 
Restriction on Mobility 
One of the setbacks of the long civil war in the region is the restriction on the 
movement of civilians. This has often been decreed by the Ethiopian government to 
isolate insurgent groups and cut them off from their support base (ibid). On the other 
hand, this strategy has undermined the economic activities of pastoralists which greatly 
depend on free movement. The environmental vulnerability of the region has always 
required pastoralists to adopt a periodic mobility pattern in search of seasonally 
distributed pastures and water points. Therefore, pastoralism is not just an economic 
activity but also an indigenous coping strategy that helps maintain the balance between 
pastoralists and their sparse natural environment. The limitation on mobility has greatly 
compromised the adaptive capacity of pastoralists to their harsh environment. This has 
in turn strained their productivity. It has also caused ecological damage by off-setting 
the balance between pastoralists and their delicate environment.  
 Food as a Weapon 
One of the effects of armed conflict in the region is the continuous inability of its 
inhabitants to produce or procure sufficient food. The region has repeatedly experienced 
famine in the last six decades. These famines have commonly been associated with the 
dry weather pattern of the region. On the other hand, Kebbede (1991) argues that while 
the adverse impact of the natural environment can’t be denied, famine susceptibility 
cannot be explained by dry weather alone. The reasons also lie within the socioeconomic 
and political factors like poverty and conflict that multiply the brute forces of nature.  
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The food insecurity in the region is not only the end result of violence but also a 
conscious instrument of warfare used by successive Ethiopian regimes. According to 
Macrae and Zwi (1994), the use of food as a weapon involves attacks on the food 
production and marketing systems, blocking the flow of commercial and relief grain to 
deficit areas, and the deliberate provisioning or withholding of food. The Ethiopian 
government has often targeted civilian food production as it is considered the major 
source of food supply for the local insurgents. On many occasions, the government has 
diverted or blocked food supplies in food shortage areas to prevent its possible outflow 
to insurgents. These actions have played important role in directing starvation against 
the people of Region 5. 
According to ARW (1991), the government’s military strategy was instrumental 
in creating the famine of 1973-75 which claimed around 55,000 lives in the region. The 
same strategy also played a big role during the massive 1983-85 famine. In 2007, the 
government deliberately blocked food supplies in major conflict zones as part of its 
counterinsurgency operation. This created a short-term humanitarian crisis in the region. 
Newsweek (2010) reported that in 2008, the government only distributed 12 percent of 
the available food aid while diverting the remaining amount. At the time, two million 
people were affected by the severe food shortage in region. 
 A Tear in the Social Fabric 
According to Collier (1998), social capital is the glue that holds societies 
together, which is essential for economic growth and well-being. Over the years, 
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pastoralists in Region 5 have established traditional institutions that are crucial in 
promoting cooperation and mitigating the effects of poverty. These institutions are broad 
and cover areas of conflict resolution, natural resource management, restorative justice, 
and transfer of resources. Orero et al (2007) argue that conflict can impact on social 
capital by causing displacement, changing household composition, disrupting family 
networks, breaking down relationships of trust, and closing off access to wider 
institutions of society. In recent years, the pastoral society of Region 5 has witnessed an 
institutional breakdown due to the effects of organized and communal conflicts (Gedi, 
2006). The long-term effects of armed conflict have created a tear in the social fabric. 
This has made it difficult to utilize social capital for collective benefit. The social 
networks which served as a positive social capital for hundreds of years are now 
disappearing.  
The Macro-Level Impact of Armed Conflicts in Region 5 
In the last fifty years, large scale conflicts fought in Region 5 and in other parts 
of Ethiopia have caused substantial cost to the economy of the country. The destruction 
of human and physical resources has reduced the level and growth of capital stock in the 
country. Protracted conflicts have greatly undermined the overall capacity of the state in 
the provision of public services. The persistent insecurity has halted domestic 
investment and relocated capital abroad. According to Geda (2004), armed conflicts 
have also distorted the composition of national spending by diverting scarce resources 
away from non-military sectors like education and health care. For instance, the 1983 
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Ethiopian state budget allocated twenty-five percent for defense spending while it set 
aside four percent for healthcare and eleven percent for education. On top of its lion’s 
share, the military had an outstanding debt of 1.1 billion dollars in 1982 (Wubeneh & 
Abate, 1988). This diversion of expenditure has also diminished spending on economic 
infrastructures, agriculture, transportation, and other public sectors. 
Summary 
In the last fifty years, armed conflict has played a critical role in shrinking the 
human, physical, economic, social, and natural capitals of households and reducing them 
into poverty. Although poverty is an outcome of most armed conflicts, in Region 5, it is 
also part of the warfare strategy used deliberately by government forces. Different 
regimes have employed war techniques that have intentionally impoverished households 
by destroying their socio-economic base and indigenous way of life. These strategies 
were placed as a way of diminishing the support base of insurgents. They have however 
created widespread poverty in the region. 
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7. Conclusion 
Region 5 is one of the most impoverished and insecure regions of Ethiopia. For 
decades, the region has suffered from a multitude of armed conflicts involving state and 
non-state actors. Region 5 is also is one of the most impoverished states of Ethiopia with 
some of the lowest indicators of human development nationwide. The poverty and 
conflict in the region are in a continuous relationship where one is the cause and effect 
of the other. One of the challenges of human security in the region is found in this 
mutually reinforcing relationship between conflict and poverty.  
The underlying source of collective violence in the region is strongly linked to 
the economic, political, and social deprivation faced by its inhabitants. Region 5 is one 
of the relatively underdeveloped and poverty stricken regions of Ethiopia on several 
socio-economic indicators. When poverty and inequality coincide with the social 
identity of a group, they result in a strong sense of grievance which can mobilize the 
group for violence.  This is true of Region 5 where the systematic exclusion of its 
population has created social frustrations that transform into organized conflicts. The 
resulting conflict has in turn exacerbated poverty in the region through the direct and 
indirect loss of human, physical, economic, social, and natural capitals. This poverty-
conflict cycle has been an on-going trend in the region for the last five decades. 
While the subject on the two-way relationship between poverty and conflict is 
certainly new, it still represents a growing area of study that is expanding the joint 
ventures of peace and development. It is also creating an interface of knowledge and 
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practice between the peacebuilding and development communities. Development is now 
becoming an integral part of conflict resolution and conflict resolution itself is now a 
prime component of development programs.   
Although poverty and conflict in the region have often been appreciated in their 
own respects, many in academic circles did not see them as two sides of the same coin.  
Any approach of attaining human security in the region requires working simultaneously 
with the two variables. The main objective of this research paper was to analyze the two-
way relationship between poverty and conflict in Region 5 and contribute to the pool of 
knowledge that seeks to develop a comprehensive approach to sustainable peace and 
development. While this research paper is certainly a jump start in a new path of 
studying human security in the twenty-first century, its contribution remains minimal 
considering the complexity and depth of poverty and conflict in the region.  
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